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The German Advantage in Civil Procedure
John H. Langbeint
Our lawyer-dominated system of civil procedure has often
been criticized both for its incentives to distort evidence and for
the expense and complexity of its modes of discovery and trial."
The shortcomings inhere in a system that leaves to partisans the
work of gathering and producing the factual material upon which
adjudication depends.
We have comforted ourselves with the thought that a law-
yerless system would be worse.' The excesses of American adver-
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sary justice would seem to pale by comparison with a literally
nonadversarial system-one in which litigants would be remitted
to faceless bureaucratic adjudicators and denied the safeguards
that flow from lawyerly intermediation.
The German advantage. The main theme of this article is
drawn from Continental civil procedure, exemplified for me by the
system that I know reasonably well, the West German.3 My theme
is that, by assigning judges rather than lawyers to investigate the
facts, the Germans avoid the most troublesome aspects of our
practice. But I shall emphasize that the familiar contrast between
our adversarial procedure and the supposedly nonadversarial pro-
cedure of the Continental tradition has been grossly overdrawn.
To be sure, since the greater responsibility of the bench for
fact-gathering is what distinguishes the Continental tradition, a
necessary (and welcome) correlative is that counsel's role in elicit-
ing evidence is greatly restricted. Apart from fact-gathering, how-
ever, the lawyers for the parties play major and broadly compara-
ble roles in both the German and American systems. Both are
adversary systems of civil procedure.4 There as here, the lawyers
advance partisan positions from first pleadings to final arguments.
German litigators suggest legal theories and lines of factual in-
quiry, they superintend and supplement judicial examination of
witnesses, they urge inferences from fact, they discuss and distin-
guish precedent, they interpret statutes, and they formulate views
of the law that further the interests of their clients. I shall urge
that German experience shows that we would do better if we were
greatly to restrict the adversaries' role in fact-gathering.
40-41, 43 (1984).
3 A somewhat similar account of Continental practice could be based upon other West-
ern European systems, although details would differ, particularly as one moves from the
Northern European systems that have been most influenced by Austrian-German legal cul-
ture, to the systems of Southern Europe, where judicial domination of fact-gathering is less
prominent and where less adequate resources have been devoted to developing and motivat-
ing the bench. See Cappelletti, Social and Political Aspects of Civil Procedure-Reforms
and Trends in Western and Eastern Europe, 69 MICH. L. REV. 847, 858-59 (1971).
4 Von Mehren remarks that, especially by contrast with criminal procedure, where ad-
versarial components are thoroughly subordinated in the Continental tradition, "the civil-
procedure systems of France, Germany and the United States were-and re-
main-adversarial." Von Mehren, The Significance for Procedural Practice and Theory of
the Concentrated Trial: Comparative Remarks, in 2 EUROP'ISCHES RECHTSDENKEN IN GE-
SCHICHTE UND GEGENwAR. FEsTSCHRIEr FOR HELMUT COING 361 n.3 (N. Horn ed. 1982).
When writers take the shortcut and speak of German or other Continental civil procedure as
"nonadversarial" (a usage that I think should be avoided although I confess to having been
guilty of it in the past), the description is correct only insofar as it refers to that distinctive
trait of Continental civil procedure, judicial conduct of fact-gathering.
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Convergence. The concluding theme of this article directs at-
tention to recent trends in American civil procedure. Having devel-
oped the view that judicialized fact-gathering has immense advan-
tages over traditional American practice, I point to the growing
manifestations of judicial control of fact-gathering in certain
strands of federal procedure. The Manual for Complex Litigation5
is infused with notions of judicial management of fact-gathering
for the multi-party Big Case, but there has been no natural stop-
ping place, and these techniques have been seeping into the con-
duct of ordinary litigation in the development that has been called
"managerial judging.""
In principle, managerial judging is more compatible with the
theory of German procedure than with our own. Having now made
the great leap from adversary control to judicial control of fact-
gathering, we would need to take one further step to achieve real
convergence with the German tradition: from judicial control to ju-
dicial conduct of the fact-gathering process. In the success of man-
agerial judging, I see telling evidence for the proposition that judi-
cial fact-gathering could work well in a system that preserved
much of the rest of what we now have in civil procedure.
I should emphasize, however, that the main concern of this ar-
ticle is not the sprawling Big Case, but the traditional bipolar law-
suit in contract, tort, or entitlement. The Big Case is testing and
instructive but quantitatively unimportant. Ordinary litigation is
the place to compare and to judge civil procedural systems."
Outline. After sketching the main features of German civil
procedure (Part I), I contrast the striking shortcomings of Ameri-
can procedure: the wastefulness and complexity of our division
into pretrial and trial procedure (Part II), and the truth-defeating
distortions incident to our system of partisan preparation and pro-
duction of witnesses (Part III) and experts. I devote special atten-
tion to the German practice in obtaining impartial expert testi-
mony (Part IV). I pause to notice how flimsy are the theoretical
justifications that have been advanced in support of adversary
domination of fact-gathering in civil litigation (Part V). Because a
more judge-centered fact-gathering process would direct attention
to the powers of the bench, I describe the incentive structure of
the German career judiciary (Part VI) and the appellate safeguards
for litigants (Part VII). Finally, I point to the potential for the con-
5 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LMGATION (5th ed. 1982).
' Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. RE V. 376 (1982).
Regarding the role of the Small Case in these developments, see infra note 138.
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vergence of the two systems arising from the appearance of mana-
gerial judging in the United States (Part VIII).
I. OVERVIEW OF GERMAN CIVIL PROCEDURE'
There are two fundamental differences between German and
Anglo-American civil procedure, and these differences lead in turn
to many others. First, the court rather than the parties' lawyers
takes the main responsibility for gathering and sifting evidence, al-
though the lawyers exercise a watchful eye over the court's work.
Second, there is no distinction between pretrial and trial, between
discovering evidence and presenting it. Trial is not a single contin-
uous event. Rather, the court gathers and evaluates evidence over
a series of hearings, as many as the circumstances require.9
I Readers interested in the detail of the German system will find, in addition to the
indigenous treatises, a surprisingly rich English-language literature. The remarkable mini-
treatise, Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, Phases of German Civil Procedure (pts. 1 & 2), 71
HARv. L. REV. 1193, 1443 (1958) [hereafter cited as Kaplan-von Mehren], although ap-
proaching its thirtieth anniversary, remains fundamentally accurate. See also 2 E.J. COHN,
MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW 162-248 (2d ed. 1971). For comparative observations growing out
of the Kaplan-von Mehren study, see Kaplan, Civil Procedure-Reflections on the Compar-
ison of Systems, 9 BUFFALO L. REV. 409 (1960) [hereafter cited as Kaplan]. William B. Fisch
updated the Kaplan-von Mehren article, with particular attention to the 1977 amendments
that are discussed infra note 9, in Fisch, Recent Developments in West German Civil Pro-
cedure, 6 HASTINGS INV'L & Comp. L. REV. 221, 236-60 (1983). On the 1977 reforms see also
Gottwald, Simplified Civil Procedure in West Germany, 31 Am. J. CoMP. L. 687 (1983). Re-
garding the appellate system, see Meador, Appellate Subject Matter Organization: The
German Design from an American Perspective, 5 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 27 (1981).
On the differing roles of lawyers, judges, and other legal professionals, see K~tz, The Role
and Functions of the Legal Professions in the Federal Republic of Germany, in DEUTSCHE
LANDESREFERATE ZUM PRIVATRECHT UND HANDELSRECHT, XI INTERNATIONALER KONGRESS FOR
RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 69 (U. Drobnig & H. Puttfarken ed. 1982) [hereafter cited as K6tz,
Legal Profession]; see also DIETRICH RUESCHMFYER, LAWYERS AND THEIR SOCIETY. A CoMPAR-
ATIVE STUDY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN GERMANY AND IN THE UNITED STATES 27-62 (1973).
1 Reforms enacted in 1976 and in force since 1977, based on practice pioneered in
Stuttgart and widely known as the "Stuttgart Model," encourage the courts to dispose of a
case in a single hearing when circumstances permit. See, e.g., LEO ROSENBERG & KARL-HEINZ
SCHWAB, ZIVILPROZESSaCHT § 84, at 456-60, § 107, at 614-17 (13th ed. 1981); see id. § 107, at
614 for bibliography. For English-language discussion, see Bender, The Stuttgart Model, in
2 ACcEss TO JUSTICE: PROMISING INSTITUTIONS 433 (M. Cappelletti & J. Weisner ed. 1979).
As modified, the code reads: "Ordinarily (in der Regel), the case should be resolved in a
single hearing, comprehensively prepared." ZIMPEOZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] (Code of Civil Pro-
cedure) § 272(I). In aid of this comprehensive preparation, ZPO § 273, formerly ZPO
§ 272(b), authorizes the court to take various steps in advance of the hearing (for example,
requiring the parties to clarify positions, obtaining documents, summoning parties and wit-
nesses to the hearing). Many simpler cases do lend themselves to one-hearing disposition,
either through court-aided settlement or by judgment. When this happens the German pro-
cedure resembles the American pattern of pretrial preparation followed by a concentrated
trial. However, even in such cases, because the court has the option to schedule further
hearings if developments at the initial hearing seem to warrant further proofs or submis-
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Initiation. The plaintiff's lawyer commences a lawsuit in Ger-
many with a complaint. Like its American counterpart, the Ger-
man complaint narrates the key facts, sets forth a legal theory, and
asks for a remedy in damages or specific relief.10 Unlike an Ameri-
can complaint, however, the German document proposes means of
proof for its main factual contentions." The major documents in
the plaintiff's possession that support his claim are scheduled and
often appended; other documents (for example, hospital files or
government records such as police accident reports or agency files)
are indicated; witnesses who are thought to know something help-
ful to the plaintiff's position are identified. The defendant's answer
follows the same pattern. It should be emphasized, however, that
neither plaintiff's nor defendant's lawyer will have conducted any
significant search for witnesses or for other evidence unknown to
his client. Digging for facts is primarily the work of the judge. 2
Judicial preparation. The judge to whom the case is entrusted
examines these pleadings and appended documents. 3 He routinely
sends for relevant public records. These materials form the begin-
nings of the official dossier, the court file. All subsequent submis-
sions of counsel, and all subsequent evidence-gathering, will be en-
tered in the dossier, which is open to counsel's inspection
continuously.
sions, German procedure is devoid of the opportunities for surprise and tactical advantage
that inhere in the Anglo-American concentrated trial. See infra text accompanying note 23.
For cases that do not lend themselves to one-hearing resolution, the 1977 amendments
have not altered the episodic character of the procedure. Further hearings may be ordered
as necessary. See, e.g., ZPO § 278(IV). "The whole procedure up to judgment may therefore
be viewed as being essentially a series of oral conferences." Katz, Civil Litigation and the
Public Interest, 1 Civ. JUST. Q. 237, 243 (1982) [hereafter cited as Katz, Civil Litigation].
German procedure recognizes something called the Konzentrationsmaxime, which, if
translated as the "principle of concentration" and equated with the rule of concentrated
trial in Anglo-American law, is a serious false cognate. The Konzentrationsmaxime ex-
presses nothing more than the general efficiency value that the court should handle the case
as rapidly as possible, and where possible in a single hearing. See, e.g., ADOLF BAUMBACH,
ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG § 253, Ubersicht at 634, T 2(E) (43d ed. 1985).
10 See ZPO § 253 (complaint); id. §§ 271, 274(H) (service on the defendant).
n ZPO § 253(IV) invokes ZPO § 130, including § 130(5), calling for the party to desig-
nate the means of proof he thinks will support his contentions of fact. For a specimen com-
plaint and other items of record from a hypothetical lawsuit rendered in English, see 2 E.
COHN, supra note 8, at 191-97.
1" For English-language discussion of this point, which is so striking to those of us bred
in the Anglo-American tradition, see Kaplan-von Mehren, supra note 8, at 1206-07, 1247-49.
13 In former times there was greater use of collegial first-instance courts, but by 1974
the tradeoff between dispatch and safeguard was resolved in favor of dispatch, and ZPO
§ 348 now presupposes a single-judge court in most circumstances. For background in En-
glish see Fisch, supra note 8, at 227-36; on the former practice, see Kaplan-von Mehren,
supra note 8, at 1206-07, 1247-49.
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When the judge develops a first sense of the dispute from
these materials, he will schedule a hearing and notify the lawyers.
He will often invite and sometimes summon the parties as well as
their lawyers to this or subsequent hearings. If the pleadings have
identified witnesses whose testimony seems central, the judge may
summon them to the initial hearing as well.14
Hearing. The circumstances of the case dictate the course of
the hearing. Sometimes the court will be able to resolve the case by
discussing it with the lawyers and parties and suggesting avenues
of compromise. If the case remains contentious and witness testi-
mony needs to be taken, the court will have learned enough about
the case to determine a sequence for examining witnesses.
Examining and recording. The judge serves as the examiner-
in-chief. At the conclusion of his interrogation of each witness,
counsel for either party may pose additional questions, but counsel
are not prominent as examiners. 15 Witness testimony is seldom re-
corded verbatim; rather, the judge pauses from time to time to dic-
tate a summary of the testimony into the dossier."6 The lawyers
sometimes suggest improvements in the wording of these summa-
ries, in order to preserve or to emphasize nuances important to one
side or the other.
Since the proceedings in a difficult case may require several
hearings extending across many months, these summaries of con-
cluded testimony-by encapsulating succinctly the results of previ-
ous hearings-allow the court to refresh itself rapidly for subse-
quent hearings. The summaries also serve as building blocks from
which the court will ultimately fashion the findings of fact for its
written judgment. If the case is appealed, these concise summaries
constitute the record for the reviewing court. (We shall see that the
first appellate instance in German procedure involves review de
novo, in which the appellate court can form its own view of the
facts, both from the record and, if appropriate, by recalling wit-
nesses or summoning new ones. 7)
14 The nineteenth-century tradition that one of the parties had to nominate a witness
before the court could examine him (Verhandlungsmaxime) has long been something of a
fiction, since a party usually detects a strong incentive to follow judicial suggestion in nomi-
nating some line of proof. The reforms of the 1970s directed to accelerating the procedure
have further accentuated the court's authority to investigate independent of party nomina-
tion. For recent complaint from the bar that the bench is straining too far in this direction,
see Birk, Wer fahrt den Zivilprozess-der Anwalt oder der Richter? 38 NEuE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT 1489, 1496 (1985).
'5 See ZPO §§ 395-97.
16 See K6tz, Civil Litigation, supra note 9, at 240.
1 See infra text accompanying notes 115-20.
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Anyone who has had to wade through the longwinded narra-
tive of American pretrial depositions and trial transcripts (which
preserve every inconsequential utterance, every false start, every
stammer) will see at once the economy of the German approach to
taking and preserving evidence."8 Our incentives run the other way;
we pay court reporters by the page and lawyers mostly by the
hour.
A related source of dispatch in German procedure is the vir-
tual absence of any counterpart to the Anglo-American law of evi-
dence. German law exhibits expansive notions of testimonial privi-
lege, especially for potential witnesses drawn from the family.'
But German procedure functions without the main chapters of our
law of evidence, those rules (such as hearsay) that exclude proba-
tive evidence for fear of the inability of the trier of fact to evaluate
the evidence purposively. In civil litigation German judges sit with-
out juries (a point to which this essay recurs20); evidentiary short-
comings that would affect admissibility in our law affect weight or
credit in German law.
Expertise. If an issue of technical difficulty arises on which
the court or counsel wishes to obtain the views of an expert, the
court-in consultation with counsel-will select the expert and de-
fine his role. (This aspect of the procedure I shall discuss particu-
larly in Part IV below.)
Further contributions of counsel. After the court takes wit-
ness testimony or receives some other infusion of evidence, counsel
have the opportunity to comment orally or in writing. Counsel use
these submissions in order to suggest further proofs or to advance
legal theories. Thus, nonadversarial proof-taking alternates with
adversarial dialogue across as many hearings as are necessary. The
process merges the investigatory function of our pretrial discovery
and the evidence-presenting function of our trial. Another manifes-
tation of the comparative efficiency of German procedure is that a
witness is ordinarily examined only once. Contrast the American
practice of partisan interview and preparation, pretrial deposition,
preparation for trial, and examination and cross-examination at
trial. These many steps take their toll in expense and irritation.
Judgment. After developing the facts and hearing the adversa-
ries' views, the court decides the case in a written judgment that
"8 But see infra text accompanying note 79.
" ZPO §§ 383-89. See generally A. BAUMBACH, supra note 9, §§ 383-389, at 1018-29.
20 See infra text accompanying notes 144-53.
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must contain full findings of fact and make reasoned application of
the law.21
II. JUDICIAL CONTROL OF SEQUENCE
From the standpoint of comparative civil procedure, the most
important consequence of having judges direct fact-gathering
in this episodic fashion is that German procedure functions with-
out the sequence rules to which we are accustomed in the Anglo-
American procedural world. The implications for procedural econ-
omy are large. The very concepts of "plaintiff's case" and "defen-
dant's case" are unknown. In our system those concepts function
as traffic rules for the partisan presentation of evidence to a pas-
sive and ignorant trier. By contrast, in German procedure the
court ranges over the entire case, constantly looking for the jugu-
lar-for the issue of law or fact that might dispose of the case.2
Free of constraints that arise from party presentation of evidence,
the court investigates the dispute in the fashion most likely to nar-
row the inquiry. A major job of counsel is to guide the search by
directing the court's attention to particularly cogent lines of
inquiry.
Suppose that the court has before it a contract case that in-
volves complicated factual or legal issues about whether the con-
tract was formed, and if so, what its precise terms were. But sup-
pose further that the court quickly recognizes (or is led by
submission of counsel to recognize) that some factual investigation
might establish an affirmative defense-illegality, let us say-that
would vitiate the contract. Because the court functions without se-
quence rules, it can postpone any consideration of issues that we
would think of as the plaintiff's case-here the questions concern-
ing the formation and the terms of the contract. Instead, the court
can concentrate the entire initial inquiry on what we would regard
as a defense. If, in my example, the court were to unearth enough
evidence to allow it to conclude that the contract was illegal, no
investigation would ever be done on the issues of formation and
terms. A defensive issue that could only surface in Anglo-American
procedure following full pretrial and trial ventilation of the whole
of the plaintiff's case can be brought to the fore in German
procedure.
21 For discussion of the importance of those safeguards, see infra text accompanying
notes 110-14.
22 For English-language discussion, see Kaplan-von Mehren, supra note 8, at 1208-31,
especially 1224-28.
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Part of what makes our discovery system so complex is that,
on account of our division into pretrial and trial, we have to dis-
cover for the entire case. We investigate everything that could pos-
sibly come up at trial, because once we enter the trial phase we can
seldom go back and search for further evidence.2" By contrast, the
episodic character of German fact-gathering largely eliminates the
danger of surprise; if the case takes an unexpected turn, the disad-
vantaged litigant can count on developing his response in another
hearing at a later time. Because there is no pretrial discovery
phase, fact-gathering occurs only once; and because the court es-
tablishes the sequence of fact-gathering according to criteria of rel-
evance, unnecessary investigation is minimized. In the Anglo-
American procedural world we value the early-disposition mecha-
nism, especially summary judgment, for issues of law. But for fact-
laden issues, our fixed-sequence rule (plaintiff's case before defen-
dant's case) and our single-continuous-trial rule largely foreclose it.
The episodic character of German civil procedure-Benjamin
Kaplan called it the "conference method" 24 of adjudication-has
other virtues: It lessens tension and theatrics, and it encourages
settlement. Countless novels, movies, plays, and broadcast serials
attest to the dramatic potential of the Anglo-American trial. The
contest between opposing counsel; the potential for surprise wit-
nesses who cannot be rebutted in time; the tricks of adversary ex-
amination and cross-examination; the concentration of proof-
taking and verdict into a single, continuous proceeding; the unpre-
dictability of juries and the mysterious opacity of their conclusory
verdicts-these attributes of the Anglo-American trial make for
good theatre. German civil proceedings have the tone not of the
theatre, but of a routine business meeting-serious rather than
tense. When the court inquires and directs, it sets no stage for ad-
vocates to perform. The forensic skills of counsel can wrest no ma-
terial advantage, and the appearance of a surprise witness would
simply lead to the scheduling of a further hearing. In a system that
cannot distinguish between dress rehearsal and opening night,
there is scant occasion for stage fright.
In this business-like system of civil procedure the tradition is
strong that the court promotes compromise.25 The judge who gath-
23 For discussion of the parallels to discovery waves under the Manual for Complex
Litigation and to bifurcated trials under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42, see infra text
accompanying notes 134-35.
24 Kaplan, supra note 8, at 410.
2 ZPO § 279 imposes upon the court the duty to explore the possibility of a settlement
19851
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ers the facts soon knows the case as well as the litigants do, and he
concentrates each subsequent increment of fact-gathering on the
most important issues still unresolved. As the case progresses the
judge discusses it with the litigants, sometimes indicating provi-
sional views of the likely outcome.2 6 He is, therefore, strongly posi-
tioned to encourage a litigant to abandon a case that is turning out
to be weak or hopeless, or to recommend settlement. The loser-
pays system of allocating the costs of litigation gives the parties
further incentive to settle short of judgment.2 7
at every stage of the proceeding. "Settlement is sometimes prized as the crown of the judi-
cial function, as the goal for which a healthy legal system continually strives." OTHMAR
JAUERNIG, ZIVILPROZESSRECHT § 48 (VII), at 171 (20th ed. 1983). Kaplan and his coauthors
remark: "The intensity and candor of the court's drive toward settlement will astonish an
American observer. In few cases does settlement go unmentioned and it is the judge who
generally initiates the discussion." Kaplan-von Mehren, supra note 8, at 1223.
In 1977 1 spent some time observing the conduct of civil cases in the main first-instance
court (Landgericht, or LG) in Frankfurt. In one case, involving the amount of child support,
the presiding judge told a defendant who was resisting the settlement recommended by the
court: "If we have to go to judgment, I assume that the judgment would not look much
different than the suggested settlement." He settled.
Settlement has many advantages, especially in the eyes of judges who promote it:
(1) It accelerates resolution of the case.
(2) No one is stigmatized as the loser.
(3) The court is spared writing a judgment, which is a considerable attraction in a legal
system that takes the contents of the written judgment so seriously, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 111-13. K~tz warns in this regard that "an activist judge who applies pressure in
order to persuade the parties to accept a settlement may be motivated, not so much by a
desire to end the litigation in a peaceable manner and thereby to protect the public interest
in reducing delay in the courts but, instead, by a wish to reduce his workload." K6tz, Civil
Litigation, supra note 9, at 238.
(4) Because settlement precludes appeal, the court knows that if it embodies its result
in a settlement rather than a judgment, there is no possibility of being reversed. (Regarding
reversal rates as a factor affecting progress in judicial careers, see infra text accompanying
note 95.)
The Kaplan-von Mehren article makes the instructive comparative point that the
greater judicial involvement in settlement in German procedure reflects the German judge's
early and active role in developing the facts. "In American practice, on the other hand, a
large percentage of settlements are concluded with the judges playing no part, for barring
preliminary motions or a pretrial conference, cases commonly do not appear before the
judges until the stage of trial." Kaplan-von Mehren, supra note 8, at 1223 n.120. On the
correlation between the growing involvement of American judges in pretrial discovery and
their larger role in promoting settlement, see infra text accompanying notes 124-32 & note
132.
28 The presiding judge is required to discuss the factual and legal aspects of the case
with the parties, ZPO § 139(I), and to advise the parties of his doubts, ZPO § 139(H).
27 ZPO § 91 announces the basic principle, although the details extend across several
special statutes, including the Kostenordnung [KosTO] (Statute on Costs) and the
Bundesrechtsanwaltsgebtihrenordnung [BRAGO] (Federal Statute on Lawyers' Fees). See
generally 1 STEiN-JONAs, KOMMENTAR ZUR ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG § 91 Vorbemerkungen at
293-304 (20th ed. 1984). For brief treatment in English, see 2 E. COHN, supra note 8, at 182-
90; Kaplan-von Mehren, supra note 8, at 1461-70; see also Pfennigstorf, The European Ex-
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HI. WITNESSES
Adversary control of fact-gathering in our procedure entails a
high level of conflict between partisan advantage and orderly dis-
closure of the relevant information. Marvin Frankel put this point
crisply when he said that "it is the rare case in which either side
yearns to have the witnesses, or anyone, give the whole truth. '28
If we had deliberately set out to find a means of impairing the
reliability of witness testimony, we could not have done much bet-
ter than the existing system of having partisans prepare witnesses
in advance of trial and examine and cross-examine them at trial.
Jerome Frank described the problem a generation ago:
[The witness] often detects what the lawyer hopes to prove at
the trial. If the witness desires to have the lawyer's client win
the case, he will often, unconsciously, mold his story accord-
ingly. Telling and re-telling it to the lawyer, he will honestly
believe that his story, as he narrates it in court, is true, al-
though it importantly deviates from what he originally
believed.29
Thus, said Frank, "the partisan nature of trials tends to make par-
tisans of the witnesses."30
Cross-examination at trial-our only substantial safeguard
against this systematic bias in the testimony that reaches our
courts-is a frail and fitful palliative. Cross-examination is too
often ineffective to undo the consequences of skillful coaching.
Further, because cross-examination allows so much latitude for
bullying and other truth-defeating stratagems, it is frequently the
source of fresh distortion when brought to bear against truthful
testimony.31 As a leading litigator boasted recently in an ABA pub-
perience with Fee Shifting, LAw & CoNrsMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 37; infra note 78.
In a valuable recent analysis of the effects of cost-shifting regimes, Steven Shavell
makes the point that cost-shifting actually increases the parties' propensity to litigate in the
situation where each overvalues his chances of prevailing. Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and
Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs,
11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 65-66 (1982). The German effort at active judicial clarification of the
facts and issues is a counterforce likely to correct such misperceptions much of the time.
" Frankel, supra note 1, at 1038 (emphasis in original).
2 J. FRANK, supra note 1, at 86.
3o Id.
31 Wigmore's celebrated panegyric-that cross-examination is "the greatest legal en-
gine ever invented for the discovery of truth"-is nothing more than an article of faith. 5
JOHN H. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1367, at 29 (3d ed. 1940). Judge Frankel explains why. "The
litigator's devices, let us be clear, have utility in testing dishonest witnesses, ferreting out
falsehoods, and thus exposing the truth. But to a considerable degree these devices are like
other potent weapons, equally lethal for heroes and villains." Frankel, supra note 1, at 1039.
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lication: "By a carefully planned and executed cross-examination, I
can raise at least a slight question about the accuracy of [an ad-
verse] witness's story, or question his motives or impartiality."32
When we cross the border into German civil procedure, we
leave behind all traces of this system of partisan preparation, ex-
amination, and cross-examination of witnesses. German law distin-
guishes parties from witnesses. A German lawyer must necessarily
discuss the facts with his client, and based on what his client tells
him and on what the documentary record discloses, the lawyer will
nominate witnesses whose testimony might turn out to be helpful
to his client. As the proofs come in, they may reveal to the lawyer
the need to nominate further witnesses for the court to examine.
But the lawyer stops at nominating; virtually never will he have
occasion for out-of-court contact with a witness. Not only would
such contact be a serious ethical breach, it would be self-defeating.
"German judges are given to marked and explicit doubts about the
reliability of the testimony of witnesses who previously have dis-
cussed the case with counsel or who have consorted unduly with a
party. '3 3
No less a critic than Jerome Frank was prepared to concede
that in American procedure the adversaries "sometimes do bring
into court evidence which, in a dispassionate inquiry, might be
overlooked. '3 4 That is a telling argument for including adversaries
in the fact-gathering process, but not for letting them run it. Ger-
man civil procedure preserves party interests in fact-gathering.
For a well-known discussion of deliberately misleading techniques of examination and cross-
examination, drawn mostly from how-to books, see J. FRANK, supra note 1, at 81-85. For
recent discussion (by a booster of adversary procedure) of the shortcomings of cross-
examination as a remedy for coaching, see Landsman, Reforming the Adversary Procedure:
A Proposal Concerning the Psychology of Memory and the Testimony of Disinterested
Witnesses, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 547, 570-71 (1984). In the hands of many of its practitioners,
cross-examination is not only frequently truth-defeating or ineffectual, it is also tedious,
repetitive, time-wasting, and insulting.
32 Hanley, Working the Witness Puzzle, LrrIGATION, Winter 1977, at 8, 10.
33Kaplan-von Mehren, supra note 8, at 1201. K6tz has written lately in a similar vein:
"German attorneys will be highly reluctant to talk with prospective witnesses. This results
in part from an ethical standard as expressed in the canons promulgated by the German Bar
Association where it is said: 'Questioning of witnesses out of court is advisable only when
special circumstances justify it. In such questioning even the appearance of attempting to
influence the witness must be avoided.' [Citing Richtlinien der Bundesrechtsanwaltskam-
mer fir die Ausabung des Anwaltsberufs, § 4 (May 11, 1957).] If any attorneys were pre-
pared to wink at this standard, which is doubtful, they would have to take account of the
further fact that German judges would take an extremely dim view of the reliability of wit-
nesses who previously had discussed the case with counsel." Katz, Civil Litigation, supra
note 9, at 241.
'1 J. FRANK, supra note 1, at 80.
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The lawyers nominate witnesses, attend and supplement court
questioning, and develop adversary positions on the significance of
the evidence. Yet German procedure totally avoids the distortions
incident to our partisan witness practice.
IV. EXPERTS
The European jurist who visits the United States and becomes
acquainted with our civil procedure typically expresses amazement
at our witness practice. His amazement turns to something border-
ing on disbelief when he discovers that we extend the sphere of
partisan control to the selection and preparation of experts. In the
Continental tradition experts are selected and commissioned by
the court, although with great attention to safeguarding party in-
terests. In the German system, experts are not even called wit-
nesses. They are thought of as "judges' aides." '35
Perverse incentives. At the American trial bar, those of us who
serve as expert witnesses are known as "saxophones." This is a re-
vealing term, as slang often is.36 The idea is that the lawyer plays
the tune, manipulating the expert as though the expert were a mu-
sical instrument on which the lawyer sounds the desired notes. I
sometimes serve as an expert in trust and pension cases, and I
have experienced the subtle pressures to join the team-to shade
one's views, to conceal doubt, to overstate nuance, to downplay
weak aspects of the case that one has been hired to bolster. No-
body likes to disappoint a patron; and beyond this psychological
pressure is the financial inducement. Money changes hands upon
the rendering of expertise, but the expert can run his meter only so
long as his patron litigator likes the tune. Opposing counsel under-
takes a similar exercise, hiring and schooling another expert to
parrot the contrary position. The result is our familiar battle of
opposing experts. The more measured and impartial an expert is,
the less likely he is to be used by either side. 7
:5 E.g., KURT JESSNrZER, DER GERICHTLICHE SACHVERSTXNDIGE 72, 78 (7th ed. 1978).
6 Equally revealing is the slang used to describe the preparation of ordinary witnesses:
"sandpapering" and "horseshedding." For remarks on the latter, see MARVIN E. FRANKEL,
PARTISAN JUSTICE 15 (1980).
37 Advertisements like the following (from the journal of the trial lawyers' association)
conjure up a vision more of the huckster than of the scientist: "EXPLODING BOTTLES-
FLYING CAPS[:] expert with 20 years worldwide experience. . . . 100% success to date."
TRIAL, Feb. 1985, at 92.
One excuse for the litigation-biased expert is the claim that "there is no such thing as a
neutral, impartial [expert] witness. . . . [He] is bound to be biased and partial, and strongly
motivated towards advocacy of his particular prejudiced point of view." Diamond, The Fal-
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At trial, the battle of experts tends to baffle the trier, espe-
cially in jury courts. If the experts do not cancel each other
out, the advantage is likely to be with the expert whose forensic
skills are the more enticing. The system invites abusive cross-
examination. Since each expert is party-selected and party-paid,
he is vulnerable to attack on credibility regardless of the merits of
his testimony. A defense lawyer recently bragged about his tech-
nique of cross-examining plaintiffs' experts in tort cases. Notice
that nothing in his strategy varies with the truthfulness of the ex-
pert testimony he tries to discredit:
A mode of attack ripe with potential is to pursue a line of
questions which, by their form and the jury's studied observa-
tion of the witness in response, will tend to cast the expert as
a "professional witness." By proceeding in this way, the cross-
examiner will reap the benefit of a community attitude, cer-
tain to be present among several of the jurors, that bias can
be purchased, almost like a commodity.3
Thus, the systematic incentive in our procedure to distort ex-
pertise leads to a systematic distrust and devaluation of expertise.
Short of forbidding the use of experts altogether, we probably
could not have designed a procedure better suited to minimize the
influence of expertise.3 9
The Continental tradition. European legal systems are, by
contrast, expert-prone.40 Expertise is frequently sought. The litera-
ture emphasizes the value attached to having expert assistance
lacy of the Impartial Expert, 3 ARCHIVS OF CRIM PSYCHODYNAMICS 221, 229-30 (1959), re-
printed in DAVID W. LOUISELL, GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & COLIN C. TArt, CASES AND MATER-
IALS ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 842, 846 (5th ed. 1983). However, it is important not to
confuse litigation-bias (hiring somebody to conform his views to the needs of your lawsuit)
with the good faith differences of opinion that can develop in scientific fields or in other
areas of expertise concerning questions that have not been authoritatively resolved. It is
true that bias may provoke a difference of opinion; it is false to reason that a difference of
opinion must reflect bias.
38 Ryan, Making the Plaintiff's Expert Yours, FOR THE DEFENSE, Nov. 1982, at 12, 13;
see also Trine, Cross-examining the Expert Witness in the Products Case, TRIAL, Nov.
1983, at 86 (taking as its leitmotif the advice from a fisherman's manual that "[t]he concept
behind playing a trout is to tire him to the point where he may be easily handled or netted,
yet is not at the portals of death").
39 See, for example, the trial judge's account of a proceeding that concerned an issue of
Salvadoran law: "[T]he experts for the respective sides contradict each other in every mate-
rial respect." Corporacion Salvadorena de Calzado, S.A. v. Injection Footwear Corp., 533 F.
Supp. 290, 293 (S.D. Fla. 1982), cited in Merryman, Foreign Law as a Problem, 19 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 151, 158 n.10 (1983).
40 See generally INSTITUT DE DROIT COMPARt DE PARIS, L'EXPERTISE DANS LES PRINCIPAUX
SYSTAMES JURIDIQUES D'EUROPE (1969).
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available to the courts in an age in which litigation involves facts
of ever-greater technical difficulty.4 The essential insight of Conti-
nental civil procedure is that credible expertise must be neutral
expertise. Thus, the responsibility for selecting and informing ex-
perts is placed upon the courts, although with important protec-
tions for party interests.
Selecting the expert. German courts obtain expert help in
lawsuits the way Americans obtain expert help in business or per-
sonal affairs. If you need an architect, a dermatologist, or a
plumber, you do not commission a pair of them to take pre-
ordained and opposing positions on your problem, although you do
sometimes take a second opinion. Rather, you take care to find an
expert who is qualified to advise you in an objective manner; you
probe his advice as best you can; and if you find his advice persua-
sive, you follow it.
When in the course of winnowing the issues in a lawsuit a Ger-
man court determines that expertise might help resolve the case,
the court selects and instructs the expert. The court may decide to
seek expertise on its own motion, or at the request of one of the
parties.42 The code of civil procedure allows the court to request
nominations from the parties4 3 -indeed, the code requires the
court to use any expert upon whom the parties agree 4 4-but
neither practice is typical. In general, the court takes the initiative
in nominating and selecting the expert.
The only respect in which the code of civil procedure purports
to narrow the court's discretion to choose the expert is a provision
whose significance is less than obvious: "If experts are officially
designated for certain fields of expertise, other persons should be
chosen only when special circumstances require. ' '45 One looks
outside the code of civil procedure, to the federal statutes regulat-
ing various professions and trades, for the particulars on official
designation. 46 For the professions, the statutes typically authorize
41 E.g., Arens, Stellung and Bedeutung des technischen Sachverstandigen im Prozess,
in EFFEKTIVITXT DES RECHTSSCHUTZES UND VERFASSUNGSMASSIGE ORDNUNG 299 (P. Gilles ed.
1983). For a volume of conference proceedings largely devoted to this topic, see DER
TECHNISCHE SACHVERSTXNDIGE IM PROZESS (F. Nicklisch ed. 1984) (see especially id. at 273ff.,
for the editor's English-language general report).
41 See ZPO § 404(I); K JESSNITZER, supra note 35, at 97.
43 ZPO § 404(111).
14 ZPO § 404(IV).
ZPO § 404(11).
46 For a list of statutes that authorize licensing and similar bodies to designate experts,
see 2 STEIN-JONAS, KOMMENTAR ZUR ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG § 404(11), at 1674-75 (19th ed.
1972); see also K. JESSNrrZER, supra note 35, at 122-23.
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the official licensing bodies to assemble lists of professionals
deemed especially suited to serve as experts. In other fields, the
state governments designate quasi-public bodies to compile such
lists. For example, under section 36 of the federal code on trade
regulation, the state governments empower the regional chambers
of commerce and industry (Industrie- und Handelskammern) to
identify experts in a wide variety of commercial and technical
fields. That statute directs the empowered chamber to choose as
experts persons who have exceptional knowledge of the particular
specialty and to have these persons sworn to render professional
and impartial expertise.47 The chamber circulates its lists of ex-
perts, organized by specialty and subspecialty, to the courts. Ger-
man judges receive sheaves of these lists as the various issuing
bodies update and recirculate them.
Current practice. In 1984 I spent a little time interviewing
judges in Frankfurt about their practice in selecting experts. 48 My
sample of a handful of judges is not large enough to impress statis-
ticians, but I think the picture that emerges from serious discus-
sion with people who operate the system is worth reporting.
Among the judges with whom I spoke, I found unanimity on the
proposition that the most important factor predisposing a judge to
select an expert is favorable experience with that expert in an ear-
lier case. Experts thus build reputations with the bench. Someone
who renders a careful, succinct, and well-substantiated report and
who responds effectively to the subsequent questions of the court
and the parties will be remembered when another case arises in his
specialty. Again we notice that German civil procedure tracks the
patterns of decision-making in ordinary business and personal af-
fairs: If you get a plumber to fix your toilet and he does it well, you
incline to hire him again.
When judges lack personal experience with appropriate ex-
perts, I am told, they turn to the authoritative lists described
above. If expertise is needed in a field for which official lists are
unavailing, the court is thrown upon its own devices. The German
judge then gets on the phone, working from party suggestions and
from the court's own research, much in the fashion of an American
litigator hunting for expertise. In these cases there is a tendency to
turn, first, to the bodies that prepare expert lists in cognate areas;
47 GEWERBEORDNUNG [GEwO] (Code on Trade Regulation) § 36.
48 I wish especially to acknowledge rewarding discussions with Dr. Erika Bokelmann,
Richterin am Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt; Dr. Heinrich Gdtzke, Vorsitzender Richter am
Landgericht Frankfurt; and Dr. Ernst Windisch, Richter am Bundesgerichtshof.
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or, if none, to the universities and technical institutes.
If enough potential experts are identified to allow for choice,
the court will ordinarily consult party preferences. In such circum-
stances a litigant may ask the court to exclude an expert whose
views proved contrary to his interests in previous litigation or
whom he otherwise disdains. The court will try to oblige the par-
ties' tastes when another qualified expert can be substituted. Nev-
ertheless, a litigant can formally challenge an expert's appointment
only on the narrow grounds for which a litigant could seek to re-
cuse a judge.49
Preparing the expert. The court that selects the expert in-
structs him, in the sense of propounding the facts that he is to
assume or to investigate,' and in framing the questions that the
court wishes the expert to address.5 0 In formulating the expert's
task, as in other important steps in the conduct of the case, the
court welcomes adversary suggestions. If the expert should take a
view of premises (for example, in an accident case or a building-
construction dispute), counsel for both sides will accompany him.51
Safeguards. The expert is ordinarily instructed to prepare a
written opinion.52 When the court receives the report, it is circu-
lated to the litigants. The litigants commonly file written com-
ments, to which the expert is asked to reply. The court on its own
motion may also request the expert to amplify his views. If the
expert's report remains in contention, the court will schedule a
hearing at which counsel for a dissatisfied litigant can confront and
interrogate the expert.
The code of civil procedure reserves to the court the power to
order a further report by another expert if the court should deem
the first report unsatisfactory.53 A litigant dissatisfied with the ex-
pert may encourage the court to invoke its power to name a second
expert. The code of criminal procedure has a more explicit stan-
dard for such cases, which is worth noticing because the literature
suggests that courts have similar instincts in civil procedure. 4 The
court may refuse a litigant's motion to engage a further expert in a
49 ZPO § 406(I). See generally A. BAUMBACH, supra note 9, § 406, at 1047-49.
50 E.g., PETER ARENS, ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 203 (2d ed. 1982).
' K. JESSNITZER, supra note 35, at 183.
, ZPO § 411(I) authorizes the court to require the expert to report in writing. The
language of the statute may make this look exceptional ("If a written report is ordered
.... "), but in practice ordering the report is quite the norm. See K JESSNITZER, supra note
35, at 166-67.
53 ZPO § 412(I).
5 See, e.g., K. JEssNiTzER, supra note 35, at 232.
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criminal case, the code says,
if the contrary of the fact concerned has already been proved
through the former expert opinion; this [authority to refuse to
appoint a further expert] does not apply if the expertise of the
former expert is doubted, if his report is based upon inaccu-
rate factual presuppositions, if the report contains contradic-
tions, or if the new expert has available means of research
that appear superior to those of a former expert.5
When, therefore, a litigant can persuade the court that an expert's
report has been sloppy or partial, that it rests upon a view of the
field that is not generally shared, or that the question referred to
the expert is exceptionally difficult, the court will commission fur-
ther expertise.5 6
A litigant may also engage his own expert, much as is done in
the Anglo-American procedural world, in order to rebut the court-
appointed expert. The court will discount the views of a party-
selected expert on account of his want of neutrality, but cases oc-
cur in which he nevertheless proves to be effective. Ordinarily, I
am told, the court will not in such circumstances base its judgment
directly upon the views of the party-selected expert; rather, the
court will treat the rebuttal as ground for engaging a further court-
appointed expert (called an Oberexperte, literally an "upper" or
"superior" expert), whose opinion will take account of the
rebuttal.57
To conclude: In the use of expertise German civil procedure
strikes an adroit balance between nonadversarial and adversarial
values. Expertise is kept impartial, but litigants are protected
against error or caprice through a variety of opportunities for con-
sultation, confrontation, and rebuttal.
The American counterpart. It may seem curious that we make
so little use of court-appointed experts in our civil practice, since
"[t]he inherent power of a trial judge to appoint an expert of his
own choosing is virtually unquestioned"58 and has been extended
and codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence59 and the Uniform
55 STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] (Code of Criminal Procedure) § 244(IV). See gener-
ally 3 LOwE-RoSENE EG, Dm STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG UND DAS GERICHTSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ
§ 244 (IV), 1 143-150 (23d ed. 1978).
'e See K. JESSNITZER, supra note 35, at 231-32.
Cf. id. at 235-36.
58 FED. R. EvID. 706 advisory committee note.
9 FED. R. EVID. 706.
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Rules of Evidence (Model Expert Testimony Act).6 0 The literature
displays both widespread agreement that our courts virtually never
exercise this authority, and a certain bafflement about why.6
While "simple inertia" 62 doubtless accounts for much (our
judges "are accustomed to presiding over acts initiated by the par-
ties"63 ), comparative example points to a further explanation. The
difficulty originates with the locktight segmentation of our proce-
dure into pretrial and trial compartments, and with the tradition
of partisan domination of the pretrial. Until lately, it was excep-
tional for the judge to have detailed acquaintance with the facts of
the case until the parties presented their evidence at trial. By then
the adversaries would have engaged their own experts, and time
would no longer allow a court-appointed expert to be located and
prepared. Effective use of court-appointed experts as exemplified
in German practice presupposes early and extensive judicial in-
volvement in shaping the whole of the proofs. It seems possible
that the rise of managerial judging (discussed below in Part VIII)
may at last achieve that precondition for effective use of court-
appointed experts in our system.6
V. SHORTCOMINGS OF ADVERSARY THEORY
The case against adversary domination of fact-gathering is so
compelling that we have cause to wonder why our system tolerates
it. Because there is nothing to be said in support of coached wit-
nesses, and very little to be said in favor of litigation-biased ex-
perts, defenders of the American status quo are left to argue that
the advantages of our adversary procedure counterbalance these
grievous, truth-defeating distortions. "You have to take the bad
with the good; if you want adversary safeguards, you are stuck with
adversary excesses."
The false conflict. This all-or-nothing argument overlooks the
fundamental distinction between fact-gathering and the rest of
civil litigation. Outside the realm of fact-gathering, German civil
procedure is about as adversarial as our own. Both systems wel-
come the lawyerly contribution to identifying legal issues and
40 UNF. R. Evw. 706, 13 ULA 319 (1974).
61 See, e.g., 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
1 706[01], at 706-8 to -12 (Supp. 1985).
" Merryman, supra note 39, at 165.
63 Id.
'4 See infra text accompanying note 130.
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sharpening legal analysis.6 5 German civil procedure is materially
less adversarial than our own only in the fact-gathering function,
where partisanship has such potential to pollute the sources of
truth.
Accordingly, the proper question is not whether to have law-
yers, but how to use them; not whether to have an adversarial com-
ponent to civil procedure, but how to prevent adversarial excesses.
If we were to incorporate the essential lesson of the German sys-
tem in our own procedure, we would still have a strongly adver-
sarial civil procedure. We would not, however, have coached wit-
nesses and litigation-biased experts.
The confusion with criminal procedure. Much of the rheto-
ric 6 celebrating unrestrained adversary domination of judicial
proceedings stems from the criminal process, where quite different
policies are at work.6 7 It has been argued that partisan fact-
gathering is appropriate to the special values of criminal proce-
dure-the presumption of innocence, the beyond-reasonable-doubt
standard of proof, and the privilege against self-incrimination. 8
Bestowing upon the criminal accused the right to conduct his own
fact-gathering, despite the risk that he may misuse this power in
truth-defeating ways, can be understood as one more way of ad-
justing the scales to protect the accused. "The specter of capital
punishment and the often barbaric conditions of our penal institu-
tions in the past and present, as well as the unique stigma of con-
viction of a crime, have had a profound impact upon the protec-
tions accorded the defendant and the freedom of action accorded
the defense lawyer in a criminal case."69 While I happen to disa-
gree that adversary procedure is a particularly effective way to im-
e' See supra text accompanying note 4.
66 The obligatory illustration is Lord Brougham's speech in the defense of Queen Caro-
line: "[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and
that person is his client. To save that client by all means and expedients ... is his first and
only duty .... ." 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (J. Nightingale ed. 1821), cited in Fried,
The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J.
1060, 1060 n.1 (1976).
67 Monroe Freedman's well-known book, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM
(1975), typifies this viewpoint. Regarding limiting this policy to criminal as opposed to civil
procedure, see, e.g., Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER. LAWYERS'
ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 83, 91-92 (D. Luban ed. 1984); Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil
Advocate, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 543, 548-50.
66 See, e.g., Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976), asserting that "the pres-
ervation of an adversary system of criminal justice" is "the fundamental purpose of the
Fifth Amendment."
619 Schwartz, supra note 67, at 550.
[52:823
19851 The German Advantage in Civil Procedure 843
plement our concern for safeguard in the criminal process,70 my
present point is simply that regardless of right or wrong, that con-
cern is absent in the world of civil procedure. In civil lawsuits we
are not trying systematically to err in favor of one class of litigants.
Equality of representation. The German system gives us a
good perspective on another great defect of adversary theory, the
problem that the Germans call "Waffenungleichheit"-literally, in-
equality of weapons, or in this instance, inequality of counsel. In a
fair fight the pugilists must be well matched. You cannot send me
into a ring with Muhammed Ali if you expect a fair fight. The sim-
ple truth is that very little in our adversary system is designed to
match combatants of comparable prowess, even though adversarial
prowess is a main factor affecting the outcome of litigation. Adver-
sary theory thus presupposes a condition that adversary practice
achieves only indifferently. It is a rare litigator in the United
States who has not witnessed the spectacle of a bumbling adver-
sary whose poor discovery work or inability to present evidence at
trial caused his client to lose a case that should have been won.
Disparity in the quality of legal representation can make a differ-
ence in Germany, too, but the active role of the judge places major
limits on the extent of the injury that bad lawyering can work on a
litigant.71 In German procedure both parties get the same fact-
gatherer-the judge. (I discuss below (in Part VI) the incentives
and safeguards designed to attract and motivate able judges.)
Prejudgment. Perhaps the most influential justification for ad-
versary domination of fact-gathering has been an argument put
forward by Lon Fuller: Nonadversarial procedure risks prejudg-
ment-that is, prematurity in judgment.72 Fuller worried that the
70 It seems unlikely that privatized fact-gathering favors the accused in American crim-
inal procedure. In the typical case the prosecution's greater resources disadvantage the ac-
cused by comparison with the nonadversarial fact-gathering of German criminal procedure.
For a discussion of German criminal procedure, see Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargain-
ing: How the Germans Do It, 78 MIcH. L. REv. 204, 206-12 (1979).
71 The active role of the German judge extends to matters of law as well as fact. The
discussion of this point in the Kaplan-von Mehren article remains quite sound: There is "an
overriding principle of German law, jura novit curia, the court knows-and is bound to
apply-general law without prompting from the parties." Kaplan-von Mehren, supra note 8,
at 1224-25 (discussing ZPO § 139); cf. id. at 1227-28.
"I Fuller's argument is usually cited to a speech text, Fuller, The Adversary System, in
TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 30 (H. Berman ed. 1961). See, e.g., Schwartz, The Professionalism
and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALI. L. REv. 669, 672 n.5 (1978) (citing that work as
"[t]he first successful attempt to analyze the adversary system"). Fuller's argument first
appeared in the report of a body known as the Joint Conference on Professional Responsi-
bility. Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159 (1958)
[hereafter cited as Fuller]. Randall cosigned the report for the ABA but must have had
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judge would make up his mind too soon.
What generally occurs in practice is that at some early point a
familiar pattern will seem to emerge from the evidence; an ac-
customed label is waiting for the case and, without awaiting
further proofs, this label is promptly assigned to it ...
An adversary presentation seems the only effective means
for combatting this natural human tendency to judge too
swiftly in terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully
known. The arguments of counsel hold the case, as it were, in
suspension between two opposing interpretations of it. While
the proper classification of the case is thus kept unresolved,
there is time to explore all of its peculiarities and nuances.
73
This passage obtains much of its force from the all-or-nothing
contrast that so misdescribes German civil procedure. In a system
like the German, which combines judicial fact-gathering with vig-
orous and continuing adversarial efforts in nominating lines of fac-
tual inquiry and analyzing factual and legal issues, the adversaries
perform just the role that Fuller lauds, helping hold the decision in
suspension while issues are framed and facts explored.
In German procedure counsel oversees and has means to
prompt a flagging judicial inquiry; but quite apart from that pro-
tection, is it really true that a "familiar pattern" would otherwise
beguile the judge into investigating too sparingly? If so, it seems
odd that this asserted "natural human tendency" towards prema-
ture judgment does not show up in ordinary business and personal
decision-making, whose patterns of inquiry resemble the fact-
gathering process in German civil procedure. Since the decision-
maker does his own investigating in most of life's decisions, it
seems odd to despair of prematurity only when that normal mode
of decision-making is found to operate in a courtroom. Accord-
ingly, I think that Fuller overstates the danger of prematurity that
inheres in allowing the decision-maker to conduct the fact-gather-
ing; but to the extent that the danger is real, German civil proce-
dure applies just the adversarial remedy that Fuller recommends. 4
Depth. Fuller's concern about prematurity shades into a dif-
nothing to do with writing it. Portions of Fuller's argument were republished in the posthu-
mously assembled work that appeared as Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92
HARV. L. REv. 353, 383 (1978).
73 Fuller, supra note 72, at 1160.
74 The assumption that adversary procedure corrects for the dangers of prejudgment
needs itself to be probed. I have known American litigators to complain of particular judges
tending to make up their minds too soon, even on the pleadings.
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ferent issue: how to achieve appropriate levels of depth in fact-
gathering. Extra investment in search can almost always turn up
further proofs that would be at least tenuously related to the case.
Adversary domination of fact-gathering privatizes the decision
about what level of resources to invest in the case. The litigants
who are directly interested in the outcome decide how much to
spend on search. In German procedure, by contrast, these partisan
calculations of self-interest are subordinated, for a variety of rea-
sons. The initiative in fact-gathering is shared with the judge; and
the German system of reckoning and allocating the costs of litiga-
tion is less sensitive to the cost of incremental investigative steps
than in our system where each side pays for the proofs that it or-
ders.7 5 On the other hand, the German judge cannot refuse to in-
vestigate party-nominated proofs without reason,76 and this mea-
sure of party control greatly narrows the difference between the
two systems.
Writing in 1958, Kaplan and his co-authors recorded their
"impression" that German civil "proceedings do not in practice
serve as an engine of discovery comparable in strength to the mod-
ern American methods, 77 in part because German courts are hos-
tile to fishing.78 Further, the authors worried that the technique of
75 See sources cited supra note 27.
71 A. BAUMBACH, supra note 9, § 286, at 749-51, % 3(B)(a)-(l).
7 Kaplan-von Mehren, supra note 8, at 1246.
78 Id. at 1247.
The extreme form of fishing that our discovery process invites, viz., bringing a lawsuit
in order to discover whether you might actually have one, is unknown not only in Continen-
tal procedure, but in English procedure as well. See, e.g., Jolowicz, Some Twentieth Cen-
tury Developments in Anglo-American Civil Procedure, in 1 STUDI IN ONORE DI ENRICO TUL-
L!o LIEBMAN 217, 241-44 (1979).
The absence of fishing-type lawsuits is more a function of the loser-pays cost-shifting
principle common to all major legal systems except our own than it is a function of different
investigative procedures. In this connection see Kaplan's remarks on aspects of discovery in
England:
[R]epresenting a possible loser, the solicitor is interested in holding down the expenses
on his own side and in seeing to it that his opponent's reimbursed expenses are kept
well within reason; representing a potential winner, he is still concerned lest he incur
expenses that will be found inessential and thus will not be reimbursed.
Kaplan, An American Lawyer in the Queen's Courts: Impressions of English Civil Proce-
dure, 69 MICH. L. REv. 821, 822 (1971).
Hostility to fishing is not confined to other legal systems, nor based solely on considera-
tions of efficiency. Judge Rifkind lamented a decade ago that
the power for the most massive invasion into private papers and private information is
available to anyone willing to take the trouble to file a civil complaint. A foreigner
watching the discovery proceedings in a civil suit would never suspect that this country
has a highly-prized tradition of privacy enshrined in the fourth amendment.
Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts? 70 F.R.D. 96, 107 (1976).
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recording witness testimony in succinct summaries could bleach
out "[fline factual differentiations." '79 They found German proce-
dure to be "far less preoccupied than the American with minute
investigation of factual detail of reliability of individual
witnesses." 80
Defenders of the American status quo may take too much
comfort from these observations. A main virtue of German civil
procedure, we recall, is that the principle of judicial control of se-
quence works to confine the scope of fact-gathering to those ave-
nues of inquiry deemed most likely to resolve the case. Fact-
gathering occurs when the unfolding logic of the case dictates that
investigation of particular issues is needed. That practice does in-
deed contrast markedly with the inclination of American litigators
"to leave no stone unturned, provided, of course, they can charge
by the stone." 81 The primary reason that German courts do less
fact-gathering than American lawyers is that the Germans elimi-
nate the waste. Likewise, when American observers notice that
there is less harrying of witnesses with "those elaborate testings of
credibility familiar to American courtrooms," '82 I incline to think
that the balance of advantage rests with the Germans, since so
Although the Kaplan-von Mehren article correctly observes that German hostility to
fishing is a tension point in the contrast with American practice, the example that the au-
thors choose to illustrate the point is wrong. Without citation to authority, they say: "Sup-
pose an eyewitness to an occurrence, testifying in court, states that another person was pre-
sent: is it permissible [for the court or the adversaries] to ask him then and there to give up
the person's name? The answer commonly given is no." Kaplan-von Mehren, supra note 8,
at 1247. However, the authors continue, "there is no bar to a party's asking the witness the
same question in the court corridor," id., after which, presumably, that side would nominate
the newly-identified witness for subsequent judicial examination. I have put this example to
countless German legal professionals familiar with German civil procedure, and I have never
found one who thought it was other than flatly wrong. Whatever the etiquette may have
been in Hamburg in the 1950s when Kaplan and his coauthors were at work, there is today
no convention restricting judge or counsel from following up such leads during the course of
courtroom examination of a witness.
79 Kaplan-von Mehren, supra note 8, at 1236.
8o Id. at 1237. In a similar vein the authors observe that the German judge's "questing
attitude" toward developing the case, encouraged by ZPO § 139 (on which, see supra note
71), tends "to debilitate German lawyers by providing them with an inward excuse for
sloppy work," although "it would be hard to say whether in the long run this is outweighed
by benefits, such as helping the party represented by an ineffective lawyer." Kaplan-von
Mehren, supra note 8, at 1228. Followers of the public speeches of Chief Justice Warren
Burger are aware that concern about the extent of sloppy lawyering is not confined to Ger-
many. Sloppiness aside, it is certainly the case that, because German judges bear the main
responsibility for fact-gathering, German lawyers do less (and get paid less) than American
lawyers. See infra note 89.
, Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 635 (1985).
82 Kaplan-von Mehren, supra note 8, at 1236.
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much of what passes for cross-examination in our procedure is de-
liberately truth-defeating. 3
Interestingly, detractors of Continental procedure have also
voiced the opposite criticism-complaining of excessive rather
than inadequate depth. Stephan Landsman, for example, defend-
ing American adversary practice against the complaint that it sets
too low a value on the discovery of material truth, warns against
inquisitorial zeal. "The weakness of human perception, memory,
and expression will often render the discovery of material truth
impossible. To become preoccupied with truth may be both naive
and futile. It is to the advantage of the adversary system that it
does not define its objectives in such an absolute and unrealistic
fashion.""4 This argument overlooks a crucial distinction-between
the case with unknowable facts and the case in which the truth-
defeating excesses of American adversary fact-gathering cause
knowable facts to be obscured. The former scarcely excuses the lat-
ter. I side with Blackstone in thinking that fact-finding is the cen-
tral task of civil litigation. "[E]xperience will abundantly shew," he
wrote, "that above a hundred of our lawsuits arise from disputed
facts, for one where the law is doubted of."' Resolve the facts,
resolve what actually happened, and the law usually takes care of
itself.
The choice between adversarial and judicial conduct of fact-
gathering need not correlate strongly with the level of search
achieved in a legal system. Factors unrelated to that choice, such
as the clarity of the substantive law or the attitude toward fishing,
will influence the levels of search. If the Germans saw any virtue in
the American practice of allowing the adversaries to cascade each
other with undigested files and records, they could in principle in-
corporate our luxuriant fishing tradition into their procedure (per-
ish the thought) while still preferring court-appointed experts and
83 See supra note 31.
84 S. LANDSMAN, supra note 2, at 36.
$1 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *330 (1768).
This emphasis on fact-finding as the central function of the civil procedural system
remains, I believe, the dominant view both in the Anglo-American tradition and in Conti-
nental civil procedure. I think that the work of John Thibaut and Laurens Walker, A The-
ory of Procedure, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 541 (1978), does not represent a true departure from this
view. When the authors call it a "misconception that the fundamental objective of the legal
process is the discovery of truth," id. at 556, they are not denying that the proper work of
the legal system is typically to establish the sequence of past events. Rather, they are point-
ing out that the experimental method for ascertaining truth in the sciences must be largely
foreclosed to the law, in part because legal disputes so characteristically do arise out of past
facts.
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forbidding adversary contact with nonparty witnesses. Further-
more, within the realm of judge-conducted fact-gathering, we
would expect the levels of search to vary significantly among legal
systems, depending upon the incentives for judicial diligence, the
scope of adversary oversight, and the effectiveness of appellate
review.
VI. JUDICIAL INCENTIVES
Viewed comparatively from the Anglo-American perspective,
the greater authority of the German judge over fact-gathering
comes at the expense of the lawyers for the parties. Adversary in-
fluence on fact-gathering is deliberately restrained. Furthermore,
in routine civil procedure, German judges do not share power with
jurors. There is no civil jury."6
Because German procedure places upon the judge the respon-
sibility for fact-gathering, -the danger arises that the job will not be
done well. The American system of partisan fact-gathering has the
virtue of its vices: It aligns responsibility with incentive. Each side
gathers and presents proofs according to its own calculation of self-
interest. This privatization is an undoubted safeguard against offi-
cial sloth. After all, who among us has not been treated shabbily by
some lazy bureaucrat in a government department? And who
would want to have that ugly character in charge of one's lawsuit?
The answer to that concern in the German tradition is
straightforward: The judicial career must be designed in a fashion
that creates incentives for diligence and excellence. The idea is to
attract very able people to the bench, and to make their path of
career advancement congruent with the legitimate interests of the
litigants.
The career judiciary. The distinguishing attribute of the
bench in Germany (and virtually everywhere else in Europe) is
that the profession of judging is separate from the profession of
lawyering. Save in exceptional circumstances, the judge is not an
ex-lawyer like his Anglo-American counterpart. Rather, he begins
his professional career as a judge.
In Germany judges and lawyers undergo a common prepara-
tory schooling. After completing a prescribed course of university
legal education that lasts several years,"" the young jurist sits a
, See infra text accompanying notes 144-53.
87 For good English-language accounts see RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW:
CASES, TEXT, MATERIALS 157-82 (4th ed. 1980); Griess, Legal Education in the Federal Re-
public of Germany, 14 J. Soc'Y PUB. TCHRs. L. 166 (1978).
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first state examination. After passing this examination satisfacto-
rily, he enters upon an apprenticeship that now lasts two and one-
half years. He clerks for judges in the civil and criminal courts,
assists in the prosecutor's office, and works in a lawyer's office. At
the conclusion of this tour of duty, the young jurist sits a second
state examination, remotely akin to our bar examination, which
concludes the certification process. Thereafter, the career lines of
judge and lawyer diverge.
Recruitment. Although West Germany is a federal state, the
state and federal courts comprise an integrated system. The courts
of first instance and the first layer of appellate courts are state
courts, while the second (and final) layer of appellate jurisdiction
operates at the federal level."" Thus, even though the basic codes
of civil and criminal law and procedure are federal codes, the state
courts have exclusive jurisdiction until the final appellate instance.
It follows that most judges are state judges;8 9 and since appoint-
ment to the federal bench is by way of promotion from the state
courts,90 all entry-level recruitment to the bench occurs at the state
level.
In each of the eleven federal states, the ministry of justice is
responsible for staffing the courts. Entry-level vacancies are adver-
tised and applications entertained from young jurists. The judici-
ary is a prized career: influential, interesting, secure, and (by com-
parison with practice of the bar) prestigious and not badly
compensated. "[O]nly the graduates with the best examination re-
sults have any chance of entering the judicial corps."91
Advancement. A candidate who is accepted begins serving as a
judge without any prior legal-professional experience, typically in
88 For detailed discussion in English, see Meador, supra note 8.
" Data for 1983 appears in STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT, STATISTISCHES JAHRBUCH 1984
FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 338 (1984). Table 15.2, "Judges in State and Federal
Service," shows 16,429 state and 493 federal judges.
Using data for the year 1973, Kdtz estimates that about one German lawyer in five is a
judge. "To the foreign observer," he notes, "the most conspicuous feature of the German
legal profession is perhaps the very large judiciary .... ." Katz, Legal Profession, supra
note 8, at 71. The size of the German bench is, of course, no mystery. "The real reason that
the Germans need more judges is the same reason that they need fewer lawyers: their civil
procedure assigns to the judiciary much of the workload that we leave to private counsel."
Langbein, Judging Foreign Judges Badly: Nose Counting Isn't Enough, JUDGES' J., Fall
1979, at 4, 6.
90 Except for the federal constitutional court, discussed infra text accompanying note
101.
" Manfred Wolf, Ausbildung, Auswahl und Ernennung der Richter, in HUMANE Jus-
z: DIE DEUTSCHEN LANDESBERICHTE ZUM ERSTEN INTERNATIONALEN KONGRESS FOR ZIVWL-
PROZESSRECHT IN GENT 1977, at 73, 77 (P. Gilles ed. 1977).
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his late twenties.2 At the outset his position is probationary, al-
though he must be promoted to tenure or dismissed within five
years.93 His first assignment may be to a court of petty jurisdiction
(Amtsgericht), or else he will become the junior member of a colle-
gial chamber of the main court of general jurisdiction (Land-
gericht, hereafter LG), where he can receive guidance from expe-
rienced judges. 4
The work of a German judge is overseen and evaluated by his
peers throughout his career, initially in connection with his tenure
review, and thereafter for promotion through the several levels of
judicial office and salary grades. A judge knows that his every step
will be grist for the regular periodic reviews that will fill his life-
long personnel file. His "efficiency rating"95 is based in part upon
objective factors, such as caseload discharge rates and reversal
rates, and in part on subjective peer evaluation. The presiding
judge of a chamber has special responsibility for evaluating the
work of the younger judges who serve with him, but the young
judges are rotated through various chambers in the course of their
careers, and this reduces the influence of an aberrant rating from
any one presiding judge. These evaluations by senior judges pay
particular regard to (1) a judge's effectiveness in conducting legal
proceedings, including fact-gathering, and his treatment of wit-
nesses and litigants; and (2) the quality of his opinions-his suc-
cess in mastering and applying the law to his cases. 6
This meritocratic system of review and promotion is meant to
92 Id. For English-language discussion of the recruitment and promotion process in Ba-
varia, see Meador, German Appellate Judges: Career Patterns and American-English Com-
parisons, 67 JUDICATURE 16, 21-25 (1983).
;3 DEUTSCHES RICHTERGESETZ [DRIG] (Statute on the German Judiciary) § 12(2). DRiG
§ 22 governs the grounds for dismissing an untenured judge; see GONTHER SCHMIDT-
RXNTSCH, DEUTSCHES RICHTERGESETZ § 22, at 202-08 (3d ed. 1983). There are special rules
limiting the competence of untenured judges, DRiG §§ 27-29, in order to assure litigants
that major decisional responsibility will be in the hands of tenured (i.e., unquestionably
independent) judges. See EDUARD KERN & MANFRED WOLF, GERICHTSVERFASSUNGSRECHT
138-39 (5th ed. 1975).
0' Although much of the work of a LG chamber is now assigned to a single judge for
discharge without collegial participation, see supra note 13, the basic unit of organization
remains the collegial chamber, and there is still an important residue of collegial first-
instance business.
" Herrmann, The Independence of the Judge in the Federal Republic of Germany, in
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR
SHIGEMITSU DANDO 61, 73 (1983).
" These factors were mentioned to me repeatedly in 1984 when I had occasion to in-
quire about the promotion process in interviews with German judges and with German law
professors specializing in civil procedure and judicial administration. See also infra note 113
and accompanying text.
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motivate the judge to perform at his best. In the main first-
instance court (LG), which is sectioned into many three-judge
panels called chambers, the judge aspires to advance to the posi-
tion of presiding judge of a chamber, a job of greater importance
and status with corresponding salary improvement. From there the
main career path leads to the first appellate instance (Ober-
landesgericht, hereafter OLG), which is also divided into many
chambers, each led by a presiding judge who is promoted to that
job after distinguishing himself as an ordinary judge of the court.97
And the final appellate instance, the federal supreme court for
nonconstitutional law (Bundesgerichtshof, hereafter BGH), is
staffed almost entirely with judges who have been promoted from
the OLG.98
Meritocratic review and promotion are meant to reward and
thereby to inspire judges to be diligent in fact-gathering, to stay
current in the law, and to be fair and accurate in the conduct of
hearings and the rendering of judgments.
Specialization. I have been speaking throughout this article of
the ordinary courts. Of the 17,000 judges who were sitting in Ger-
many as of 1983, the most recent year for which the statistics are
published, 13,000 sat in the ordinary courts.9 The others served in
the specialized court systems for administrative law, tax and fiscal
matters, labor and employment law, and social security.10 Further-
97 Wolf, supra note 91, at 77; see also Meador, supra note 92, at 22-23.
" Meador, supra note 92, at 24-25. The BGH now has more than a hundred judges and
a dozen chambers. Call to that court is perhaps not quite the prize that we might imagine
the pinnacle to be. There has been some concern that not enough of the best OLG judges
aspire to join the BGH, despite the enhancement in rank, authority, and compensation that
promotion to the BGH entails. The opportunity for promotion to the BGH usually comes
when a judge is well into his forties or fifties and long settled in his home state. The BGH
sits in Karlsruhe, an unexciting city on the southwestern fringe of the country. Some promi-
nent OLG judges decline to exile themselves and their families to Karlsruhe from life in
Munich, Dusseldorf, Frankfurt, or Hamburg. We can imagine the problem in American
terms by supposing that we had created a supreme court of nonconstitutional law and sited
it in Akron, Boise, or Macon; perhaps we would have found Learned Hand and Henry
Friendly not too anxious for that last round of promotion. But laying aside this peculiarity
about the BGH, it can be said with great confidence that most German judges aspire to
maximize their chances for promotion through the lower levels of the pyramid.
" STATISTISCHEs BUNDESAMT, supra note 89, at 338 (Table 15.2).
100 For discussion in English, see ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN & JAMES R. GORDLEY, THE
CiviL LAW SYSTEM 133-37 (2d ed. 1977); Meador, supra note 8, at 31-34. Continental special-
ized court systems are distinguished from ours by having their own appellate systems. In the
United States, appeal lies from the specialized tax court to the regular courts of appeal, and
thereafter to the Supreme Court. In Germany, appeal lies from the tax court to the supreme
court for tax matters, with no possibility of review by the federal supreme court of ordinary
jurisdiction (BGH).
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more, the Germans operate a separate supreme constitutional
court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), to which the other courts refer
some contentious constitutional business. Appointment to the con-
stitutional court is by design highly political; members are seldom
part of the career judiciary that I have been describing. 101
The specialized courts and the constitutional court siphon off
business that Americans would expect to see in the ordinary
courts. Within the German ordinary courts of first instance there
are special divisions that have counterparts in our tradition-for
crime, for what we would call probate, for domestic relations. In
addition, commercial law matters are removed to specialized cham-
bers. 10 2 Thus, the German ordinary courts of first instance have a
somewhat narrower diet than our own.
At the appellate level, including the first appellate instance
(OLG) that proceeds by review de novo, there is extensive speciali-
zation. An OLG is quite large by our standards, sometimes staffed
with more than a hundred judges, who sit in chambers containing
four or five judges. Cases are allocated among these chambers on
the basis of subject matter.103 All the medical malpractice cases go
to one chamber, the maritime cases to another, and so forth. This
system permits the judges to develop over the years just that sort
of expertise in legal subspecialties that we expect of lawyers, par-
ticularly lawyers in large-firm practice, in the United States. The
litigants get judges who know something about the field, in contra-
distinction to the calculated amateurism of our appellate
tradition. 0 4
Political influence. Judicial appointments and promotions is-
101 For an English-language account, now a little dated, see DONALD P. KOMMERS, JUDI-
CIAL POLITICS IN WEST GERMANY A STUDY OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 113-59
(1976).
102 GERICHTSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ [GVG] (Statute on the Organization of the Courts)
§§ 93-95. See generally OTTO R. KISSEL, GERICHTSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ §§ 93-95, at 894-911.
101 For commentary in English, see Meador, supra note 8, at 44-72.
14 The case for the generalist judiciary is argued anew in RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 147-60 (1985). It would entail a large digression in the
present article to detail all of my disagreements with Judge Posner's treatment of this sub-
ject. I find particularly unpersuasive Posner's central claim that specialized courts are un-
workable in fields where differences of view persist among the specialists. "It is remarkable
in how few fields of modem American law there is a professional consensus on fundamental
questions." Id. at 153. This is an exaggeration, and one that resembles in an eerie way the
all-law-is-politics theme of a contemporary legal-academic movement with which Posner is
ordinarily not associated. The truth is that even in fields like constitutional law or torts
(Posner's examples) where much is unsettled, there are vast areas of consensus. The work of
legal doctrine is to forge consensus. The more learned the court, the more likely is the court
to do that job well.
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sue in the name of the state or federal minister of justice, who is
an important political official, usually a member of the state or
federal parliament and of the cabinet. The minister acts in consul-
tation with an advisory commission of senior judges;105 in some of
the German states that commission has a formal veto power.
Directly political concerns appear to be very subordinated in
the selection and advancement of judges. Because this subject is
not much ventilated in the literature, I have inquired about it
when talking with German judges and legal academics. The im-
pression I have gained is that political considerations do not mate-
rially affect appointment or promotion until the level of the federal
supreme court (BGH).0 6 Party balance is given weight in BGH ap-
pointments, but political connections do not substitute for merit.
Positions on the BGH go to judges who have distinguished them-
selves on the OLG.
We must remember that the decision to isolate important
components of constitutional and administrative-law jurisdiction
outside the ordinary courts in Germany lowers the political stakes
in judicial office, by comparison with our system, in which every
federal district judge (and for that matter, every state judge) pur-
ports to brandish the Constitution and thus to be able to wreak
major social and institutional change.
American contrasts. If I were put to the choice of civil litiga-
tion under the German procedure that I have been praising in this
article or under the American procedure that I have been criticiz-
ing, I might have qualms about choosing the German. The likely
venue of a lawsuit of mine would be the state court in Cook
County, Illinois, and I must admit that I distrust the bench of that
court. The judges are selected by a process in which the criterion
of professional competence is at best an incidental value.107 Fur-
106 For discussion of Bavarian practice, see Meador, supra note 92, at 22-23.
108 See Wolf, supra note 91, at 77-78.
10' The following remarks by Justice Seymour Simon of the Illinois Supreme Court,
made in an unpublished speech, deserve wide attention:
For 15 years I was an elected ward committeeman in the nation's most publicized local
political party organization, the Democratic Party of Cook County. As a committee
member, I attended slate-making sessions for judges as well as other candi-
dates-sessions which, until recent years, always were held behind closed doors. There,
I have seen those seeking to be picked as judges sponsored and praised by their com-
mitteemen, but praised not for their learning and experience in the law, praised not for
their academic backgrounds or legal achievements, but praised instead for their loyalty
to their political party, for their work in the precincts or, in the political lingo that
became standard usage in appraising the quality of judicial aspirants, "for remember-
ing from whence they came." Recently a committeeman who was also an alderman was
quoted as favoring an aspirant because he would be an "alderman's judge." I have
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ther, while decent people do reach the Cook County bench in sur-
prising numbers, events have shown that some of their colleagues
are crooks. If my lawsuit may fall into the hands of a dullard or a
thug, I become queasy about increasing his authority over the
proceedings.
German-style judicial responsibility for fact-gathering cannot
be lodged with the Greylord judiciary. Remodeling of civil proce-
dure is intimately connected to improvement in the selection of
judges. I do not believe that we would have to institute a German-
style career judiciary in order to reform American civil procedure
along German lines, although I do think that Judge Frankel was
right to "question whether we are wise" to disdain the Continental
model, and to "wonder now whether we might benefit from some
admixture of such [career judges] to leaven or test our trial
benches of elderly lawyers." 10 8 The difference in quality between
the state and federal trial benches in places like Cook County is
sufficient to remind us that measures far short of adopting the
Continental career judiciary can bring about material
improvement. 10
heard would-be judicial candidates asked to pledge their support to all the other candi-
dates on their party's ticket even though they had no idea who these candidates would
be. Sometimes judgeships were parceled out to ward organizations because it was "their
turn" or as a reward for performance in previous elections .
John Gilligan, Governor of Ohio from 1971 to 1975. . . ,wrote this about judicial
elections: "It's a murderous ordeal to go through. It takes a full year out of your life
handing out matchbooks and going to wiener roasts. There are lawyers who would be
very fine judges who simply would not subject themselves to that.. ....
Of still greater concern is the unfortunate truth that the all-pervasive need for
campaign funds in modern politics intertwines judicial elections with political fundrais-
ing..... Although under our Supreme Court Rules and those of the ABA a [campaign]
committee ostensibly shields a candidate from the identity of his campaign contribu-
tors, a candidate is not prohibited from attending his own fundraising parties where he
can observe who shows up and who doesn't. For that matter, I wonder how many judi-
cial candidates turn down checks handed to them by acquaintances who meet them on
the street. And, all campaign contributions, including names of contributors of more
than $150, must be reported by the fundraising committee so that anyone who is curi-
ous, including the candidate or his friends or family, can examine these reports. And
there is no rule against examining an opponent's reports.
S. Simon, After "Greylord" What? Address at the Chicago Bar Association and Illinois
State Bar Association 1983 Dinner Honoring Illinois Supreme Court 4-5, 6-7, 10-11 (Novem-
ber 4, 1983) (unpublished speech; copy on file with The University of Chicago Law Review).
109 Frankel, supra note 1, at 1033.
109 Part of what makes the federal bench more attractive-that the supremacy clause
makes federal judges more powerful-is beyond emulation. But other attributes of the fed-
eral judicial career that could be copied must affect the quality of the recruits. For example,
the federal salary scale, while hardly munificent, is significantly better than at the state
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Americans will long remain uncomfortable at the prospect of a
more bureaucratic judiciary. We have not had good experience at-
tracting and controlling an able career bureaucracy in the higher
realms of public administration, although we have scarcely tried.
Some observers point to that elusive construct, national character.
Europeans in general and Germans in particular are thought to be
more respectful of authority, hence better disposed toward the
more bureaucratic mode of justice that judicialized fact-gathering
entails.
Cultural differences surely do explain something of why insti-
tutional and procedural differences arise in different legal systems.
The important question for present purposes is what weight to at-
tach to this factor, and my answer is, "Not much." It is all too easy
to allow the cry of "cultural differences" to become the universal
apologetic that permanently sheathes the status quo against criti-
cism based upon comparative example. Cultural differences that
help explain the origins of superior procedures need not restrict
their spread. If Americans were to resolve to officialize the fact-
gathering process while preserving the political prominence of the
higher bench, we would probably turn initially to some combina-
tion of judges, magistrates, and masters for getting the job done.
Over time, we would strike a new balance between bench and bar,
and between higher and lower judicial office.
The rise of American managerial judging (discussed in Part
VIII below) should put us on notice that we may no longer have
the leisure to decide whether we want more judicial authority over
civil litigation. If greater judicial control of civil proceedings is in-
evitable, greater attention to safeguarding litigants' interests
against abuse of judicial power must follow. The German model
should inspire attention to the way judicial career incentives
(above all, meritocratic selection, review, and promotion) can serve
as safeguards for litigants.
VII. APPELLATE REviEw
Like the career incentives that encourage good judicial per-
formance, the German appellate process is designed to protect liti-
level, especially when account is taken of the generous federal judicial pension scheme. Life-
time tenure makes the federal judicial career more attractive, sparing federal judges from
the career uncertainty and indignity to which state trial judges are exposed through the
elective process, on which see supra note 107. The appointive process for selecting judges
enhances the influence of the organized bar and other interest groups that have some con-
cern to assure professional competence in the judiciary.
1985]
The University of Chicago Law Review
gants from caprice, error, or sloth. The adversarial component of
lawyerly oversight, to which this article has so often referred, ulti-
mately depends for its effectiveness upon the threat of appellate
review. From the standpoint of comparison with American proce-
dure, two attributes of German appellate practice appear especially
noteworthy: (1) the requirement, meant to facilitate review, that
the first-instance court disclose in writing its findings of fact and
reasons of law; and (2) the de novo standard of review.
Disclosure of grounds. Unless the first-instance court is suc-
cessful in encouraging the parties to settle,110 it must decide the
case by means of a written judgment containing findings of facts
and rulings of law."1 The thoroughness of the German judgment is
legendary. 12 Empirical study has shown how seriously the first-
instance courts take their judgment-writing responsibility.'13
Judges know that they will be judged on the quality of their opin-
ions. Good opinions reduce the reversal rate and win esteem in the
peer evaluation process. Judges know that the reviewing court will
have convenient access to the whole of the evidence and the sub-
missions received at first-instance, since the dossier goes up with
the appeal. Especially when coupled with searching review by an
appellate court of great ability, the requirement of written findings
and reasons is a bulwark against arbitrary or. eccentric adjudica-
tion. In our system, by contrast, the conclusory general verdict of a
jury is the antithesis of a reasoned judgment; nor do we insist on
much better in the realm of bench trials." 4 Fact-finding in Ameri-
can courts all too often resembles Caligula dealing with vanquished
gladiators: thumbs up or thumbs down, yours but to wonder why.
Review de novo. Ultimately, it is the prospect of appellate re-
view in German civil procedure that makes the other safeguards
effective, both as deterrents and as correctives. The dissatisfied lit-
igant has the right of appeal de novo (Berufung) in the first appel-
late instance (typically the OLG)."15 No presumption of correctness
110 See supra note 25.
"I ZPO § 313(1)(5)-(6); see 2 STEIN-JONAS, supra note 46, § 313(IV)-(V), at 1279-84.
112 See Weyrauch, The Art of Drafting Judgments: A Modified German Case Method,
9 J. LEa. ED. 311, 316-26 (1956).
13' In a considerable sample of nondivorce cases that went to judgment (i.e., that re-
sisted settlement) in the main first-instance court (LG), an average 43% of the total time
devoted to all aspects of the courts' work (including review of the dossier, fact-gathering,
and oral hearings) was spent on writing the judgment. 2 BUNDESRECHTSANWALTSKAMMER,
TATSACHEN ZUR REFORM DER ZIVLGERICHTSBARKEril. AUSWERTUNGEN 64-65 (1974).
"" See Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEXAs L. REV. 579, 630 & n.311
(1984).
I'l Appeal de novo lies from the court of petty jurisdiction (Amtsgericht) to the court
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attaches to the initial judgment. What makes this astonishingly
liberal system of appellate review possible is the extreme economy
of the technique, previously discussed, of recording in pithy sum-
maries the evidence gathered at first instance.116 Retrial becomes
for the most part only rereading.
The OLG "may choose to rehear evidence and is likely to do
so when demeanor of a witness seems important or when the rec-
ord fails to give sufficient detail. ' 1 7 The main task in review de
novo is not, however, gathering new evidence, but considering
afresh the record and the judgment from below. OLG review guar-
antees to the dissatisfied litigant a second look by a panel of long-
experienced judges on all matters of law and fact. In other words,
for a litigant who wishes it, fact-finding will be reassigned from the
court that did the primary fact-gathering (and this is another way
in which German procedure may be said to respond to Lon Fuller's
concern about the danger of prejudgment in the investigating
courts1 5 ). OLG review is collegial; a panel of several judges decides
the case.1 9 And because the OLG panels are specialized by subject
matter, chances are that some of the judges who decide the case
will be masters of the particular field of law.
From the OLG there is a further level of review (by the BGH)
according to a standard of review (Revision) that approximates the
Anglo-American notion of review for error.1 0
Adequacy of safeguards. There is no denying the power of the
German judge, yet complaints about the misuse of judicial power
are extremely rare. The career incentives and the system of appel-
late review have been designed to deter and correct abuse. Experi-
ence suggests that they work.
of general jurisdiction (LG). For the LG, which is the main first-instance court, the OLG is
the court with responsibility for review de novo.
Following are some figures that give a feel for the frequency of appeal de novo to the
OLG from the LG. In 1981 the LGs had a first-instance caseload of 574,860 cases and the
OLGs had a caseload of 85,021. The LGs decided 106,538 cases by full judgment ("streitiges
Urteil"), which is the main cohort of cases that can give rise to appeal de novo; in the same
year the OLG decided 25,299 cases by "streitiges Urteil." STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT, supra
note 83, at 339 (Table 15.4.1).
l See supra text accompanying notes 15-18.
117 Kaplan-von Mehren, supra note 8, at 1451; see id. at 1453 (discussing the purposes
of review de novo).
11 See supra text accompanying notes 72-74.
11 See Kaplan-von Mehren, supra note 8, at 1451.
120 Id. at 1454.
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VIII. AMERICAN MANAGERIAL JUDGING: CONVERGENCE?
Important changes have occurred in recent years that diminish
the contrast between German and American civil procedure. Under
the rubric of case management, American trial judges are exercis-
ing increasing control of the conduct of fact-gathering. Although
many American courtrooms remain untouched by the new develop-
ments, the changes have occurred broadly enough to have about
themselves the look of the future.
The Manual. Managerial judging arose in the federal courts as
a response to the increasing quantity of so-called "complex litiga-
tion"-cases that involve "unusual multiplicity or complexity of
factual issues." 121 The Manual for Complex Litigation was created
to deal with these cases, but because complexity is a matter of de-
gree, managerial judging was hard to confine to the Big Case. The
Manual identifies antitrust, securities, mass disaster, product lia-
bility, class action, and multiparty cases, among others, as typi-
cal. 122 In cases with many parties and many issues, the feeling grew
that court-centered control was needed to prevent the confusion
and duplication that would result if the adversaries were "left to
themselves, each pursuing the course that is most favorable to his
particular client.1 23 Accordingly, "[t]he essence" of what the Man-
ual propounds "is the exercise of judicial control over complex liti-
gation plus a positive plan for discovery and pretrial
preparation. '1 2 4
The Manual effects judicial control over adversary fact-
gathering through a set of interconnected measures:
(1) The judge uses pretrial conferences to explore the
case with counsel and to identify key issues.12 5
(2) The judge is expected to promote settlement from the
earliest opportunity. 26
(3) The judge also helps sharpen the issues. "To the ex-
tent feasible the judge should narrow the issues in the course
of the first pretrial conference and limit discovery
12MANUAL, supra note 5, § 0.22.
122 Id.
123 Id. § 1.10.
124 Id. (italics deleted).
125 Id. § 1.20. The Manual also encourages "the practice of obtaining counsel's views of
the case by requiring the filing before discovery of initial pretrial briefs containing all the
legal and factual contentions of the parties." Id. We have seen that it is characteristic of
German practice that counsel may guide the court's work by submitting written commen-
tary on issues of law or fact. See supra text between notes 20 and 21.
126 MANUAL, supra note 5, § 1.21.
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accordingly. 127
(4) Issue definition leads to the regulation of discovery.
The court convenes discovery conferences and breaks discov-
ery into "waves."' 2 Thus, the court decides what subjects
may be investigated in what sequence. This power has now
been codified for the ordinary Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in revised rule 26(f): "Following the discovery confer-
ence, the court shall enter an order tentatively identifying the
issues for discovery purposes, establishing a plan and schedule
for discovery .... ,,129
(5) The Manual recommends that the court explore the
need for expert testimony early, in part in order "to deter-
mine whether court appointment of an expert is desirable."' 30
Convergence. What makes the Manual look "proto-Germanic"
in the eyes of the comparative lawyer is the informal feel of "the
conference method;"'13 and the active judicial role in defining is-
sues, promoting settlement, 32 and fixing the sequence for fact-
gathering.
To be sure, managerial judging in the pretrial process leaves
adversary domination of the trial (especially jury trial) largely un-
affected. But the vast preponderance of cases settle or are dis-
missed before trial; pretrial procedure is the whole procedure for
most of our caseload. 133
12 Id. § 1.30.
128 Id. § 0.50 ("Ordinarily, in a complex case, use of sequential discovery-first wave,
second wave, and special issue-promotes efficiency, orderliness, and early completion of all
permissible discovery."); see also id. § 1.50.
121 FED. . Civ. P. 26(f). "Rule 26(f) mandates the holding of a discovery conference
upon proper motion by a party. In the complex case, however, the judge should not ordina-
rily wait for the filing of such a motion . . . ." MANUAL, supra note 5, § 1.95. Judge
Schwarzer has expressed "dissatisfaction" that the Manual is inadequately directive. WiL-
LIAM W. SCHWARZER, MANAGING ANTITRUST AND OTHER CoMPLEx LITIGATION: A HANDBOOK
FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES § 1-1, at 4 (1982).
13o MANUAL, supra note 5, § 2.60; see also id. § 3.40.
131 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. Judith Resnik remarks on the informal-
ity of managerial judging, noticing that these conferences resemble "ordinary business meet-
ings." Resnik, supra note 6, at 407.
132 Resnik, who popularized the term "managerial judging," observes the similarity to
the German practice in promoting settlement as it was described in the Kaplan-von Mehren
article. "Ironically, their description of the German judge--'. . . as insistent promoter of
settlements'--now seems apt for the American judge as well." Resnik, supra note 6, at 386
(citing Kaplan-von Mehren, supra note 8, at 1472).
133 "[O]ver ninety percent of the cases in most courts terminate through settlement or
dismissal prior to trial." Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix? 69 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 14 (1984); see id. at 4 n.7 (citing ADMINISTRATIvE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 1983, at 142 (Table 29)).
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Moreover, judicial control of the pretrial process interacts with
certain features of trial procedure. Early identification of issues
and issue-specific discovery can lead to issue-specific trial, that is
partial trial, under rule 42(b). 3 One could envision manipulating
these powers to replicate something of the German court's control
over the sequence of issue-identification and fact-gathering in the
development of a lawsuit.133 And under rule 53(c), which empowers
the court to refer issues to a master for investigation and report,
36
one could imagine further movement toward judicial conduct of
fact-gathering. That is, however, still a glimmer; the important
trend has been toward judicial control of the adversaries' conduct
of the investigatory function, not judicial conduct of the
investigation.
Thus, while managerial judging leaves untouched some of the
worst abuses of our trial procedure such as coached witnesses and
partisan experts, it has reoriented pretrial procedure away from
adversary domination; and in a legal system that actually tries only
a tiny fraction of its civil caseload, judicial capture of pretrial
could become more important than continuing adversary control of
trial.
The importance of managerial judging ought not to be over-
stated. Managerial judging is prevalent in the federal courts, but
less evident in the state systems where complex litigation is less
prevalent. (Many of the state systems also lack an essential predi-
cate for managerial judging, the continuous-case-management sys-
tem in which a case remains assigned to the same trial judge from
initial docketing to final judgment.) Moreover, even within the fed-
eral system, managerial judging is routine only for complex cases
that require to be dealt with under the Manual. Outside the realm
of the Big Case, the litigant gets managerial judging only if, by the
fortuity of the case-assignment wheel, he draws a managerial
judge. If you get assigned to Robert Keeton or Prentice Marshall
or William Schwarzer, you get managerial judging. If you draw a
traditional federal district judge, you get old-style adversary domi-
1- FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
135 See supra text accompanying notes 22-27.
'36 FED. R. Civ. P. 53(c). But see Brazil, Referring Discovery Tasks to Special Masters:
Is Rule 53 a Source of Authority and Restrictions? 1983 AM B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 143. For
an account of the work of the court-appointed masters in managing pretrial procedures in
the mammoth AT&T antitrust case, see Hazard & Rice, Judicial Management of the Pre-
trial Process in Massive Litigation: Special Masters as Case Managers, in WAYNE D. BRA-
ZIL, GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & PAUL R. RICE, MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATION: A PRACTIcAL
GUIDE TO THE USE OF SPECIAL MASTERS 77 (1983).
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nation of the pretrial process. It is hard to imagine that our system
can long continue to leave such fundamental choices to luck and
whim.
Safeguards. Not only does whim determine whether a litigant
gets managerial judging, but whim can surface in the conduct of
managerial judging. Judith Resnik observes:
[M]anagerial responsibilities give judges greater power. Yet
the restraints that formerly circumscribed judicial authority
are conspicuously absent. Managerial judges frequently work
beyond the public view, off the record, with no obligation to
provide written, reasoned opinions, and out of the reach of
appellate review.
. . . [B]ecause managerial judging is less visible and usu-
ally unreviewable, it gives trial courts more authority and at
the same time provides litigants with fewer procedural safe-
guards to protect them from abuse of that authority.137
Viewed from the perspective of comparative law, therefore, Ameri-
can managerial judging displays contrasting tendencies. On the one
hand, it exhibits convergence toward the Continental model of ju-
dicial domination of the fact-gathering process. On the other hand,
the haphazard growth of managerial judging has not been accom-
panied by Continental-style attention to safeguarding litigants
against the dangers inherent in the greatly augmented judicial role.
The career incentives for our judiciary are primitive, and the stan-
dards of appellate review barely touch the *pretrial process.
The trend toward managerial judging is irreversible, 138 because
13 Resnik, supra note 6, at 378, 380. Under the rubric of "managerial judging," Resnik
brings two trends: the one that so interests us in the present article, the growth of judicial
participation in the fact-gathering work of the pretrial process; and the phenomenon to
which Chayes directed attention a decade ago, the increasing judicial responsibility for de-
vising and adjusting complex remedial orders in the post-trial process, primarily for public
law litigation. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv.
1281 (1976).
38 Resnik's article, which is so instructive in pointing to the dangers that lurk in un-
constrained managerial judging, sometimes conveys the impression that managerial judging
is a foible that the judiciary might be persuaded to abandon. E.g., Resnik, supra note 6, at
445 (the federal bench has been "[sleduced by controlled calendars, disposition statistics,
and other trappings of the efficiency era and the high-tech age"; further, "[n]o one has con-
vincingly discredited the virtues of disinterest and disengagement, virtues that form the
bases of the judiciary's authority."). This yearning for the golden age of judicial passivity
exaggerates the potential for retracing our steps, because it does not give due weight to the
factors that gave rise to managerial judging: the growth in complex litigation and the diffi-
culty of distinguishing the Big Case from slightly smaller cases.
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the trend toward complexity in civil litigation that gave rise to
managerial judging is irreversible. If we were to learn from the suc-
cess of the long established German tradition of managerial judg-
ing, we would not only improve our safeguards, we would en-
courage more complete judicial responsibility for the conduct of
fact-gathering. For example, we might have the judge (or a surro-
gate such as a master or a magistrate) depose witnesses and assem-
ble the rest of the proofs, working in response to adversary nomi-
nation and under adversary oversight as in German procedure. We
might then be able to forbid the adversaries from contact with wit-
nesses-in other words, we could abolish the coaching that dis-
graces our civil justice. We would also be able to routinize the use
of court-appointed experts. And if we were to concern ourselves
with devising a standard of appellate review appropriate to the se-
riousness of managerial judging, we might want to experiment with
the German technique of succinct recordation of evidence.139
Concentration. When Kaplan sought "the grand discriminant,
the watershed feature, so to speak, which shows the English and
American systems to be consanguine and sets them apart from the
In emphasizing the Big Case as the origin of managerial judging in American procedure,
I do not mean to imply that I think that managerial judging ought to be confined there. To
the contrary, I agree with the point that Hein K6tz has long asserted, most recently in K~tz,
Zur Funktionsteilung zwischen Richter und Anwalt im deutschen und englischen Zivil-
prozess, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR IMRE ZAJTAY 277, 290-91 (R.H. Graveson et al. eds. 1982), that
the German advantage in civil procedure is at its greatest in the Small Case, where the
costliness of adversary fact-gathering is intolerable. See also Jolowicz, supra note 78, at 270
(cited by K6tz, predicting that the Anglo-American systems will experience "an abandon-
ment of the adversary process, even if only for small claims"). For cogent evidence of the
judicial hand in small claims litigation, see Galanter, Palen & Thomas, The Crusading
Judge: Judicial Activism in Trial Courts, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 699, 706-08 (1979).
A full account of the decline of adversary fact-gathering in the real practice of modern
American dispute resolution would also give due attention to the rise of administrative
decision-making. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JusTICz MANAGING SOCIAL SE-
CUITY DIsABEITY CLAIMS (1983), describing one comer of the field:
There are perhaps 5,600 state agency personnel (supported by 5,000 more) whose sole
function is to adjudicate disability claims. Over 625 federal administrative law judges
hear administrative appeals from state agency denials. This total of more than 6,000
adjudicators approaches the size of the combined judicial systems of the state and fed-
eral governments of the United States. And the claims that these officials adjudicate
are not small. The average, present, discounted value of the stream of income from a
successful disability application is over $30,000. Disability claims, on the average, thus
have a value three times that required by statute for the pursuit of many civil actions
in federal district courts.
Id. at 18.
139 MANUAL, supra note 5, § 2.711, relying upon FED. R EviD. 1006, notices the possibil-
ity of using summary rather than verbatim testimony for "[v]oluminous or complicated
data." On the parallel to German techniques of recording and consulting testimony, see
supra text accompanying notes 15-18.
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German, the Italian, and others in the civil-law family," he found
it in our "single-episode trial as contrasted with discontinuous or
staggered proof-taking" on the Continent.14 0 Arthur von Mehren
has advanced a similar view, showing in a recent article how exten-
sively the concentrated trial has affected the rest of our civil
procedure. 141
For the future, however, I doubt that the contrast between
systems of concentrated and discontinuous trial will have such
prominence in thinking about comparative civil procedure. The
tendency of our pretrial process to displace the trial, a phenome-
non long evident in American criminal procedure, 142 is now in-
creasingly manifest in civil procedure as well. Between discontinu-
ous trial in the Continental tradition and our system of
discontinuous pretrial proceedings followed by concentrated trial,
the difference need not be all that great, especially since so few of
our cases actually go to trial. Although ostensibly conducted in
preparation for the concentrated trial, managerial judging in its
more important aspects is directed toward suppressing the trial.
Managerial judging succeeds best when pretrial clarification pro-
duces settlement, capitulation, or dismissal.
Even when civil cases do advance to trial in our system, much
of what has made the trial so consequential is the latitude for ad-
versary distortion in the fact-adducing process. Accordingly, I in-
cline to point to a different "grand discriminant" between the two
legal cultures-not concentration, but adversarial versus judicial
responsibility for gathering and presenting the facts. If our concen-
trated trial occurred after nonadversarial fact-gathering in the pre-
trial process, our trial might ultimately resemble somewhat the
current German review-de-novo proceeding for first appeals. 4 3 At
trial the court would recall and examine key witnesses afresh,
while facts not in serious controversy would be elicited from the
pretrial dossier.
The jury. "The common law system," writes von Mehren,
"had to concentrate trials because of the jury. . . The presence
140 Kaplan, supra note 78, at 841.
"' Von Mehren, supra note 4.
142 I have discussed the origins and the shortcomings of our nontrial plea bargaining
procedure in Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 L. & Soc'Y
REv. 261 (1979), and Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CH. L. REv. 3 (1978).
43 See supra text at note 116. Note further that developments in German procedure
have also been undermining the contrast between concentrated and discontinuous trial. Re-
garding the German effort to limit discontinuity, see supra note 9; see also von Mehren,
supra note 4, at 370-71.
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of a jury makes a discontinuous trial impractical."' 44 Historically,
it is surely correct that concentration of the trial eliminated the
problems of reassembling and controlling groups of laymen across
long intervals, problems that would otherwise have bedeviled a sys-
tem of routine but discontinuous jury trial. "Moreover, at least un-
til relatively modern times, there was probably no way in which
material presented at widely separate points in time could have
been preserved in a form that would have enabled the jury to re-
fresh its recollection when it ultimately came to deliberate and
render the verdict."'145 In an age of stenographically reported and
now videotaped testimony, however, those concerns look less
fundamental. 146
Although civil jury trial is a comparative rarity within the de-
clining subset of our cases that go to any kind of trial,147 the jury
entitlement is enshrined in the seventh amendment and in compa-
rable state constitutional guarantees. There is a substantial body
of opinion that the civil jury is a worthwhile safeguard, and that
view can scarcely be gainsaid as long as our trial bench remains, at
the margin, so unreliable.
The question arises, therefore, whether the jury guarantee will
continue to dominate our increasingly juryless practice. In the con-
text of comparative civil procedure, the question is whether the
jury tradition that underlies the Anglo-American concentrated
trial is a true "grand discriminant," capable of preventing conver-
gence toward Continental procedure. An initial cause for doubt is
that the Anglo-American tradition has been for half a century de-
cisively sundered in the matter of the jury entitlement. The En-
glish effectively abolished civil jury trial in 1933.148 Paradoxically,
however, theirs is the more faithful adherence to the tradition of
the concentrated trial, because their pretrial process is less devel-
oped. What has continued to unite English and American civil pro-
144 Von Mehren, supra note 4, at 364 (note omitted).
145 Id. at 364-65.
'16 See, e.g., M. FRANKEL, supra note 36, at 109-14, discussing the Ohio experiment in
which judicially edited videotaped evidence is replayed for the trial jury. Frankel observes
the potential for this technique to help liberate us from the concentration requirement, and
thus to bring us closer to Continental civil procedure. Id. at 113-14.
147 Two decades ago Kenneth Culp Davis gathered data indicating that "[flive out of
six trials in courts of general jurisdiction are without juries." Davis, An Approach to Rules
of Evidence for Nonjury Cases, 50 A.B.A. J. 723, 723 (1964).
148 ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: (MIscELLANEOUS PROVISIONS) ACT, 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5,
ch. 49, § 6. See Ward v. James, [1966] 1 Q.B. 273, 279-303, for discussion of the minute
residual sphere of civil jury trial in England.
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cedure, therefore, is adversary domination of fact-gathering. 149
But must the American jury entitlement ultimately defeat
convergence toward the German model? In other words, is judicial
responsibility for fact-gathering incompatible with lay adjudica-
tion? We have little direct experience, since European legal sys-
tems do not share our preoccupation with the jury in civil proce-
dure. The Germans employ juror-like lay judges for first-instance
proceedings in various of the specialized courts (labor, social, com-
mercial, administrative, tax) and in the courts that handle cases of
serious crime. 150 The lay judging system combines lay and profes-
sional judges in a single panel (a "mixed court") that deliberates
and decides together. I have elsewhere had occasion to describe the
German mixed court, and to contrast it with our jury court in the
realm of criminal procedure. 151 I came to the conclusion that while
each form of court structure has advantages, the two are broadly
comparable in serving the main purposes of the jury guarantee. 152
Elsewhere in Europe, true jury courts have been incorporated into
criminal procedural systems that retain strongly nonadversarial
pretrial processes. 53 Key witnesses who have been examined in the
officialized pretrial are simply recalled for the jury. Accordingly,
the indications are that judicial conduct of fact-gathering could be
smoothly integrated into the jury tradition.
Abridging adversary theory. It is curious that managerial
judging took hold so easily in a legal system supposedly governed
by the counterprinciple of judicial inactivity. 54 Because manage-
149 At least for the present, the Americans do not find English companions on the early
steps of the path of convergence toward German-style judicial responsibility for fact-
gathering. The predicate is lacking-the English have not followed us into managerial judg-
ing. The English have restricted in a variety of ways the growth of complex multi-party
litigation, the phenomenon that gave rise to American managerial judging. English substan-
tive law is narrower, their pretrial system is primitive, their multi-party practice is less per-
missive, and their loser-pays cost-shifting rules deter adventurous litigation. See R. Prich-
ard, A Systemic Approach to Comparative Law- The Effect of Cost, Fee, and Financing
Rules on the Development of the Substantive Law, J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming); Jolowicz,
supra note 78, at 226-57, especially 242-44.
150 See generally EKKEHARD KLAUSA, EHRENAMTLICHE RICHTER. IHRE AuswAHL UND
FUNKTION, EMPIRISCH UNTERSUCHT (1972).
151 Langbein, Mixed Court and Jury Court: Could the Continental Alternative Fill the
American Need? 1981 Ax B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 195.
152 Id. at 215-19.
' See GERHARD CASPER & HANS ZEisEL, DER LAiENRICHTER IM STRAFPROZESS 9-10
(1979).
'" See Miller, supra note 133, at 21-22, for some interesting conjectures on why the
bar has not resisted the rise of managerial judging. For the cheering endorsement of the
American College of Trial Lawyers, see AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERs, RECOMmEN-
DATIONS ON MAJOR IssuEs AFFECTING ComPLEx LITIGATION (1981).
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rial judging imposes such major limits on partisan autonomy in
fact-gathering, it is in principle irreconcilable with that branch of
adversary theory that purports to justify adversary fact-gathering.
Regardless of where managerial judging is headed for the fu-
ture, it has already routed adversary theory. I take that as further
support for the view advanced in Part V that adversary theory was
misapplied to fact-gathering in the first place. Nothing but inertia
and vested interests justify the waste and distortion of adversary
fact-gathering. The success of German civil procedure stands as an
enduring reproach to those who say that we must continue to suf-
fer adversary tricksters in the proof of fact.
